State v. Jardine, CAAP-20-0000153

Defendant John Keoni Jardine was charged by felony information with second-degree assault under HRS § 707-711(1)(a) (causing substantial bodily injury) and/or (1)(d) (causing bodily injury with a dangerous instrument).
The information tracked the statutory language but did not recite the statutory definitions of “substantial bodily injury” or “dangerous instrument,” nor specify the particular type of injury alleged.
HRS § 707-700 defines “substantial bodily injury” by listing five specific injuries (e.g., major laceration, second-degree burn, bone fracture, serious concussion, tearing/rupture of internal organs).
Jardine moved to dismiss the information as defective; the circuit court granted the motion and dismissed the charge without prejudice for failing to include the statutory definition or specify the alleged injury.
The State appealed; the Intermediate Court of Appeals affirmed, holding the statutory definition of “substantial bodily injury” is narrower than the common meaning and therefore had to be pleaded; the court did not need to resolve the “dangerous instrument” issue.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the statutory definition of “substantial bodily injury” coincides with its common meaning so that inclusion in the charge is unnecessary	The State: charging language mirroring the statute is sufficient; requiring the statutory definition would make charges unduly complex (HRPP Rule 7(d))	Jardine: the statutory definition is narrower than the common meaning and must be pleaded or the specific injury alleged must be stated	The court held the statutory definition is narrower than the common meaning; the information was defective for failing to plead the statutory definition or specify the type of injury (dismissal affirmed)
Whether the statutory definition of “dangerous instrument” coincides with its common meaning	The State: statutory language in the information is sufficient	Jardine: statutory definition (if different) must be pleaded	Not reached by the court

State v. Kauhane, 452 P.3d 359 (Haw. 2019) (explains when statutory definitions that differ from common meaning must be included in a charge)
State v. Pacquing, 389 P.3d 897 (Haw. 2016) (charges must include statutory definition or specify the exact items when a defined term is broader/narrower than common meaning)
State v. Baker, 463 P.3d 956 (Haw. 2020) (recognizes that statutory definitions that diverge from common meaning require inclusion in the charge)
State v. Wheeler, 219 P.3d 1170 (Haw. 2009) (addresses when statutory definitions must be pleaded because common meaning is broader)
State v. Mita, 245 P.3d 458 (Haw. 2010) (discusses HRPP Rule 7(d) and complexity concerns but does not override the need to plead statutory definitions when required)