127 A.3d 65
R.I.2015Background
- In August 2004 James Oliveira (grandfather) was accused of digitally penetrating his six‑year‑old grandson, Phillip; Phillip disclosed the abuse to his mother the next morning. Police obtained Oliveira’s oral and written admissions and DNA testing showed seminal fluid in rectal samples matching Oliveira.
- Oliveira was indicted on two counts of first‑degree child molestation; convicted at a first trial but this Court vacated that conviction in State v. Oliveira, 961 A.2d 299 (R.I. 2008), because a post‑Miranda custodial statement was admitted after the right to counsel attached; the Court remanded for retrial.
- The record was returned to Superior Court in early 2009; Oliveira’s retrial ultimately began in October 2012 — a roughly 45‑month delay after remand which Oliveira claimed violated his speedy‑trial rights.
- Much of the pretrial delay was attributable to defense counsel (first Cotoia, then Morrissey): Cotoia repeatedly stated he was not ready and sought continuances; Morrissey filed multiple motions and engaged in plea negotiations and preparation. Neither defense counsel pressed a speedy‑trial demand during most of the delay; the state repeatedly represented readiness to try the case.
- At retrial the court admitted testimony recounting Phillip’s out‑of‑court disclosures (mother, detective, and hospital physician), over Oliveira’s hearsay objections; Oliveira was convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment and appealed on speedy‑trial and hearsay grounds.
Issues
| Issue | State's Argument | Oliveira's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether 45‑month delay after remand violated Sixth Amendment speedy‑trial right | Much of delay was caused by defense counsel; state was ready for trial; defendant acquiesced or failed to diligently assert right; no specific prejudice shown | Delay was presumptively prejudicial and attributable to the State after remand; defendant vigorously asserted speedy‑trial rights | Court: Delay was presumptively prejudicial but Barker factors favor state; delay largely attributable to defense (counsel’s unpreparedness and reasonable trial preparation); no sufficient assertion or prejudice by Oliveira; no violation |
| Whether trial court erred admitting child’s out‑of‑court statements (excited utterance / other exceptions) | Statements admissible as excited utterance or non‑hearsay (to explain police action); any erroneous admission was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt given overwhelming evidence | Admission of mother’s and witnesses’ recounting of Phillip’s disclosure was hearsay and prejudicial; trial justice abused discretion | Court: Trial justice did not abuse discretion admitting the child’s excited utterance to mother; portions of detective’s testimony were hearsay but harmless given strong independent evidence; any error in physician’s testimony was likewise harmless |
Key Cases Cited
- Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (established four‑factor speedy‑trial balancing test)
- Vermont v. Brillon, 556 U.S. 81 (allocating delay caused by assigned counsel to defendant)
- Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647 (prejudice may be presumed from excessive delay)
- State v. Oliveira, 961 A.2d 299 (R.I. 2008) (prior opinion vacating conviction on Sixth Amendment assistance‑of‑counsel ground)
- Bido v. State, 56 A.3d 104 (R.I. 2012) (Rhode Island application of Barker factors)
- State v. Powers, 643 A.2d 827 (R.I. 1994) (threshold for presumptively prejudicial delay)
- State v. Perez, 882 A.2d 574 (R.I. 2005) (premature speedy‑trial motions ineffective)
- State v. Delahunt, 401 A.2d 1261 (R.I. 1979) (trial readiness and effect of post‑motion trial preparation)
- State v. Momplaisir, 815 A.2d 65 (R.I. 2003) (harmlessness of cumulative hearsay when guilt otherwise established)