State v. James Cushing, 128 A.3d 896

Defendant James Cushing was charged with domestic assault arising from an alleged incident in which two bouncers witnessed him strike his girlfriend, Joeleen Cameron, across the street from a club.
At arraignment the court imposed conditions of release including a no-contact order (condition 14) and a 300-foot stay-away (condition 31); defense objected only to the no-contact condition.
The State requested an evidentiary hearing; at the July 29 hearing the State presented two eyewitness bouncers who testified they saw Cushing strike Cameron and that Cushing used abusive language toward one witness.
Cameron testified for the defense, denied being struck, and asked that no-contact conditions be lifted because she lived with Cushing and relied on him financially and domestically.
The trial court found the bouncers credible, rejected Cameron’s testimony as not credible regarding the strike, and imposed the no-contact condition as necessary to protect Cameron.
On appeal the Supreme Court reviewed only condition 14 (no-contact), declined to address condition 31 (no timely objection below), and affirmed because the record supported the court’s exercise of discretion under 13 V.S.A. § 7554.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the no-contact condition (condition 14) was improperly imposed	State argued the no-contact order was appropriate to protect the alleged victim based on eyewitness testimony and is commonly imposed in domestic-assault cases	Cushing argued the court failed to impose the least restrictive combination of conditions, did not properly consider statutory factors (family ties, residence, circumstances), and that the no-contact order was a physically restrictive condition requiring extraordinary circumstances	Affirmed: Court found the no-contact condition authorized by § 7554(a)(3), supported by credible eyewitness testimony, and within the court’s discretion

State v. Parda, 455 A.2d 323 (Vt. 1982) (recognizes trial court discretion to impose conditions of release)
State v. Patch, 488 A.2d 755 (Vt. 1985) (standard for reversing discretionary rulings: abuse of discretion where decision is clearly untenable or unreasonable)
State v. Barrows, 776 A.2d 431 (Vt. 2001) (mem.) (same standard quoted for reviewing discretionary orders)