State v. Jaimes-Pineda, 350 P.3d 465

Defendant was convicted after a jury trial of two counts of fourth-degree assault and two counts of harassment arising from an altercation reported by neighbor Bowers.
During the first day’s lunch break an off-record incident occurred; prosecutor said defendant threatened Bowers, defense said Bowers’ husband instigated and defendant did not threaten her.
Trial court allowed only limited questioning: whether Bowers was threatened (yes/no) but excluded detailed testimony about the lunch-hour incident to avoid a “trial within a trial.”
Defense sought to call defendant’s friends to testify about the incident to rebut Bowers’ account; the court refused to permit detailed testimony under its stated interest in avoiding collateral litigation of the lunch incident.
Jury convicted on all counts; court sentenced defendant to probation with 60 days jail and imposed $1,300 in court-appointed attorney fees.
On appeal defendant argued (1) the court erroneously excluded rebuttal evidence and (2) the court plainly erred by imposing attorney fees despite defendant’s alleged indigence; the Oregon Court of Appeals affirmed.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Admissibility of detailed rebuttal evidence about lunch-hour incident	Evidence of threat (Bowers) was admissible and probative of guilt; state allowed limited inquiry into whether a threat occurred	Excluded detailed testimony deprived defendant of relevant evidence to rebut state’s theory (guilty conscience)	Court preserved objection; evidence was relevant but exclusion of detailed testimony was within trial court’s OEC 403 discretion to avoid a "trial within a trial"
Imposition of court-appointed attorney fees	Record supports inference defendant may be able to pay (testimony about being a farm equipment mechanic, expecting to return to work)	Defendant unemployed/indigent; court plainly erred under ORS 161.665 by imposing fees without finding ability to pay	No plain error: record contained sufficient evidence to infer defendant may be able to pay, so fees were permissible

State v. Phillips, 314 Or. 460, 840 P.2d 666 (1992) (offer of proof may be made through counsel statements if nature of evidence is adequately described)
State v. Haugen, 349 Or. 174, 243 P.3d 31 (2010) (counsel’s description can preserve evidentiary error)
State v. Burdge, 295 Or. 1, 664 P.2d 1076 (1983) (distinguishing collateral impeachment from impeachment on independently relevant facts)
State v. Gibson, 338 Or. 560, 113 P.3d 423 (2005) (a fact is non-collateral if it is logically relevant to material facts in issue)
State v. Moore, 324 Or. 396, 927 P.2d 1073 (1996) (OEC 403 rulings reviewed for abuse of discretion)
State v. Huffman, 65 Or. App. 594, 672 P.2d 1351 (1983) (probative value vs. prejudice under OEC 403)
State v. Fish, 239 Or. App. 1, 243 P.3d 873 (2010) (excluding low-probative, highly prejudicial statements was within trial court discretion)
State v. Larson, 222 Or. App. 498, 193 P.3d 1042 (2008) (ability-to-pay may be inferred from record facts)
State v. Eshaia, 253 Or. App. 676, 291 P.3d 805 (2012) (limited income evidence can support imposition of modest attorney fees)