429 P.3d 674
N.M. Ct. App.2018Background
- Defendant Sharoski Jackson was convicted by a jury of human trafficking (Section 30-52-1(A)(2)), promoting prostitution, accepting earnings from a prostitute, contributing to the delinquency of a minor (CDM), and conspiracy based on interactions with a minor, B.G., in early 2013.
- The State's theory: Jackson recruited/obtained B.G. for commercial sexual activity, used a phone/email tied to backpage.com ads, exchanged photos and texts, and received money from B.G.'s transactions.
- Key physical/digital evidence: a digital forensic report from two phones (712 and 804 numbers), text messages and multimedia, backpage.com ads listing the 712/804 contacts, photographs of B.G. on the 712 phone matching the ads, and emails with Jackson’s personal documents linked to the 712 number.
- At trial B.G. testified about being 17 in March 2013 and about incidents where Jackson arranged or directed prostitution activity.
- Post‑trial, Jackson sought a new trial based on a recorded post‑trial call in which B.G. allegedly implied she lied at trial; the recording was later lost, and only a disputed transcript remained.
Issues
| Issue | State's Argument | Jackson's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether knowledge of victim's age is an element of human trafficking under §30-52-1(A)(2) | The statute need not include knowledge of age; "knowingly" modifies the act (recruiting/soliciting/etc.), not the victim's age | Jury should have been instructed that conviction required proof Jackson knew victim was under 18 | Held: Knowledge of victim's age is not an element; no instruction required |
| Admissibility/authentication of text messages | Texts were properly authenticated by digital forensic expert, links between phones, ads, photos, voice ID and email; admissible (not hearsay or fit exceptions) | State failed to lay foundation; messages could have been authored by others; hearsay concerns | Held: Admission not an abuse of discretion; foundation sufficient and many messages non-hearsay or not offered for truth |
| Sufficiency of evidence for convictions | Digital/ testimonial evidence (ads, texts, photos, B.G.'s testimony, money transfers) sufficient when viewed in favor of verdict | Evidence ambiguous; some acts voluntary by B.G.; alternative explanations | Held: Evidence sufficient for all convictions when viewed in light most favorable to verdict |
| Denial of new trial based on post-trial recording | The recorded statement, if anything, was impeachment and would not probably change outcome; did not meet requirements for newly discovered evidence | Recording shows B.G. admitted lying at trial and would change result; warrants new trial | Held: Denial affirmed — recording was merely impeaching/contradictory and did not satisfy the six‑part test |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Parvilus, 332 P.3d 281 (N.M. 2014) (statutory interpretation reviewed de novo; give effect to legislative intent)
- State v. Almanzar, 316 P.3d 183 (N.M. 2014) (plain‑language canon; words given ordinary meaning)
- State v. Jonathan M., 791 P.2d 64 (N.M. 1990) (when statute is clear, give effect to language)
- State v. Lozoya, 399 P.3d 410 (N.M. Ct. App. 2017) (CDM does not require proof defendant knew child’s age)
- United States v. Washington, 743 F.3d 938 (4th Cir. 2014) (18 U.S.C. §2423(a) "knowingly" modifies the transport, not the victim's age)
- United States v. Tavares, 705 F.3d 4 (1st Cir. 2013) (age provision serves as aggravator and does not require proof defendant knew age)
- United States v. Daniels, 653 F.3d 399 (6th Cir. 2011) (interpretation that minors get special protection; "knowingly" applies to act)
- State v. Romero, 999 P.2d 1038 (N.M. Ct. App. 2000) (knowledge of third‑party order was required in certain CDM contexts — distinguished)
- State v. Gunter, 529 P.2d 297 (N.M. 1974) (minors entitled to special protection)