State v. Jackson
2018 Ohio 2146
Ohio Ct. App.2018Background
- Nathaniel Jackson was convicted in 2002 of two counts of aggravated murder (and related offenses) for plotting and killing Robert Fingerhut; jury recommended death and trial court imposed death sentence.
- Co-defendant Donna Roberts was separately convicted and originally sentenced to death; the Ohio Supreme Court vacated Roberts’ death sentence because the judge used prosecutorial assistance in preparing the sentencing opinion without defense participation (ex parte communication).
- On remand in Jackson’s case, the trial judge admitted similar ex parte drafting in Jackson; this Court ordered the judge to personally re-evaluate sentencing and enter a new sentencing opinion; the death sentence was reimposed and affirmed by the Ohio Supreme Court.
- In 2017, after the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Hurst v. Florida, Jackson sought leave to file a delayed motion for a “new mitigation trial” arguing Ohio’s capital scheme violates the Sixth Amendment (jury must find facts supporting death sentence).
- The trial court denied leave as time-barred under Crim.R. 33 and R.C. 2953.21 and found Jackson’s Hurst-based claim meritless because Ohio’s scheme differs from Florida’s; Jackson appealed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (Jackson) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Jackson’s motion for leave to file a delayed Crim.R. 33 new-trial motion was timely | Motion untimely under Crim.R. 33(B); no basis to grant leave | Hurst created a new basis that could not have been anticipated, so delay was excusable | Court: Trial court erred by not analyzing "unavoidably prevented," but error harmless because Crim.R. 33 is not the correct vehicle |
| Whether Crim.R. 33 can provide a new sentencing/mitigation hearing | Crim.R. 33 governs new trials per caption | Captioned as Crim.R. 33, Jackson seeks a new mitigation (sentencing) trial | Court: No Ohio criminal rule authorizes a new sentencing hearing; Crim.R. 33 was improper vehicle |
| If construed as postconviction relief, whether Jackson’s petition was timely or fits R.C. 2953.23(A)(1) exceptions | Jackson contends Hurst is a new rule warranting collateral relief | Jackson argues Hurst could not have been raised earlier | Court: Trial court failed to analyze 2953.23 exceptions, but harmless; Hurst does not show retroactivity because Ring (on which Hurst relies) is not retroactive on collateral review |
| Whether Ohio’s death-penalty scheme violates the Sixth Amendment under Hurst/Ring/Apprendi | Hurst requires jury factfinding for death eligibility, so Ohio scheme is unconstitutional | Ohio’s scheme differs materially and requires critical jury findings; thus constitutional | Court: Declines to reach constitutional question but notes controlling Ohio precedent holds Ohio’s scheme constitutional; rejects Hurst-based relief |
Key Cases Cited
- Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016) (Supreme Court invalidating Florida’s death-sentencing scheme for failing to require jury factfinding for the facts that permit death)
- Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002) (held that any fact increasing maximum punishment in capital cases must be found by a jury)
- Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) (principle that any fact increasing penalty beyond statutory maximum must be proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt)
- Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348 (2004) (held Ring announced a new procedural rule that does not apply retroactively on collateral review)
- State v. Roberts, 110 Ohio St.3d 71 (2006) (Ohio Supreme Court vacated Roberts’ death sentence for improper ex parte prosecutorial participation in drafting the sentencing opinion)
- State v. Jackson, 149 Ohio St.3d 55 (2016) (Ohio Supreme Court affirmed Jackson’s resentencing after judge re-evaluated and entered a new sentencing opinion)
