State v. Jackson
297 Neb. 22
| Neb. | 2017Background
- In 1999, 17-year-old Earnest D. Jackson was convicted of first-degree murder for the killing of Lance Perry and sentenced to life imprisonment; his conviction and sentence were previously affirmed on direct appeal.
- Following Miller v. Alabama and Montgomery v. Louisiana, Nebraska vacated Jackson’s life sentence and ordered resentencing under the juvenile homicide sentencing statute, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-105.02.
- At resentencing, the court held a full mitigation hearing: defense presented expert testimony on adolescent brain development and a forensic psychological evaluation addressing statutory mitigating factors (age, impetuosity, family environment, capacity to appreciate consequences, intellectual capacity) and evidence of Jackson’s rehabilitation in custody.
- The State emphasized the jury’s murder verdict and eyewitness testimony placing Jackson as an active participant who struck and shot the victim.
- The district court considered the statutory factors and psychological reports, but did not make detailed factfinding on certain Miller-specified considerations; it resentenced Jackson to 60–80 years with credit for time served, making him parole-eligible in roughly 13.5 years.
- Jackson appealed, arguing the court failed to properly consider required factors (extent of participation, immaturity, vulnerability to peers, and demonstrated maturation/rehabilitation) and thus abused its discretion in imposing an excessive sentence.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether resentencing complied with Miller/Montgomery and § 28-105.02 | Jackson: court failed to meaningfully consider Miller factors (role in offense, immaturity, peer influence, rehabilitation) and must make explicit findings | State: court held full mitigation hearing, considered statutory factors and reports; sentence within statutory limits | Court: No abuse of discretion; sentencing complied with Miller and § 28-105.02 |
| Whether juvenile homicide offenders categorically barred from life without parole | Jackson: (implicit) Miller requires strict protections for juveniles | State: Miller does not categorically bar LWOP for homicide if individualized consideration occurs | Court: Miller does not categorically forbid LWOP for homicide; individualized consideration required (followed) |
| Whether resentencing required specific written factfinding on each Miller factor | Jackson: resentencing must include explicit findings on participation, immaturity, vulnerability, and rehabilitation | State: no statutory or Miller mandate for specific factfinding language; full hearing suffices | Court: No requirement for specific factfinding language; legislative sentencing procedure adequate |
| Whether sentence was excessive / an abuse of discretion | Jackson: 60–80 years is excessive given his youth and demonstrated rehabilitation | State: sentence reflects seriousness of homicide, jury conviction, and sentencing court’s discretion | Court: Sentence within statutory limits and appropriate; affirmed |
Key Cases Cited
- Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) (mandatory life without parole for juvenile homicide offenders unconstitutional; sentencer must consider youth-related differences)
- Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016) (Miller rule announced a substantive constitutional rule entitled to retroactive application)
- Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010) (life without parole for juveniles convicted of nonhomicide offenses unconstitutional; juveniles must have meaningful opportunity for release)
- State v. Mantich, 295 Neb. 407 (Neb. 2016) (Nebraska sentencing procedure for juvenile homicide offenders satisfies Miller; no requirement for specific written factfinding)
- State v. Nollen, 296 Neb. 94 (Neb. 2017) (discusses Miller/Graham framework and juvenile sentencing considerations)