State v. J.M., Jr.(075317), 137 A.3d 490

Background

Defendant J.M., a massage therapist, was charged with second-degree sexual assault and fourth-degree criminal sexual contact for allegedly digitally penetrating customer E.S. during a 2012 massage; E.S. reported trauma consistent with digital penetration.
The State sought to admit testimony under N.J.R.E. 404(b) from A.W., an earlier alleged victim who had accused J.M. of a similar 2006 sexual assault in Florida but who had been acquitted in that prior proceeding.
The trial court admitted A.W.’s testimony after finding the Cofield four-prong test satisfied (relevance to motive/intent/plan, similarity, clear-and-convincing proof, and probative value outweighing prejudice).
The Appellate Division reversed, holding the other-crime evidence inadmissible, announcing a per se rule excluding acquitted-act evidence, and urging a special jury instruction when such evidence is pivotal.
The New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed the Appellate Division insofar as the Florida-act evidence failed the Cofield test and was inadmissible, but declined to adopt a blanket rule barring acquitted-act evidence or the appellate panel’s recommended jury-instruction reform.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether A.W.’s prior-act testimony was admissible under N.J.R.E. 404(b) (Cofield four-prong test)	The prior incident is probative on material issues (motive/intent/plan/absence of mistake), is similar in kind and time, is shown clearly and convincingly, and its probative value outweighs prejudice.	The testimony is impermissible propensity evidence; defendant denies the charged act occurred (so intent/mistake not genuinely disputed) and the prior act is too remote/dissimilar to show plan.	Evidence was inadmissible: it failed the first Cofield prong (not relevant to a genuinely disputed issue) and failed the fourth prong (prejudice outweighed probative value).
Whether an acquittal of the prior charge makes prior-act evidence per se inadmissible	The appellate bright-line exclusion is incorrect; acquittal should not automatically bar admission because the Cofield analysis (including clear-and-convincing requirement) already accounts for acquittals.	Acquitted-act evidence should be excluded because a jury already rejected the prior allegation and admitting it undermines the acquittal’s force and risks unfair prejudice.	Rejected a per se bright-line rule excluding acquitted-act evidence; acquittal is a significant factor (often weighing against clear-and-convincing), but admissibility must remain fact-specific under Cofield.
Whether, when acquitted-act evidence is admitted and is pivotal, jurors must be instructed to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the prior act before considering it	The State opposed imposing a requirement that jurors re-find the prior act beyond a reasonable doubt, arguing it would create trial-within-a-trial problems and usurp the trial judge’s gatekeeping role.	Appellate Division proposed that if such evidence is pivotal, the jury should be told it must be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the prior act before giving it weight.	Court declined to adopt this reformulated instruction, finding it would prompt trials-within-a-trial, distract jurors, and improperly substitute for the judge’s admissibility determination. Trial judge remains gatekeeper.

Key Cases Cited

State v. Cofield, 127 N.J. 328 (1992) (establishes the four-prong test for admitting other-crime evidence under N.J.R.E. 404(b))
State v. Reddish, 181 N.J. 553 (2004) (discusses the prejudicial tendency of prior-conduct evidence and burden on proponent to justify admission)
State v. Weeks, 107 N.J. 396 (1987) (notes propensity concerns and tendency of prior-conduct evidence to suggest guilt)
State v. Stevens, 115 N.J. 289 (1989) (explains limits on using other-crime evidence to show plan and caution in evaluating similarity and remoteness)
State v. Koskovich, 168 N.J. 448 (2001) (reinforces trial judge’s gatekeeping obligation and clear-and-convincing requirement for other-crime proof)
State v. Gillispie, 208 N.J. 59 (2011) (standard that admission/exclusion of evidence rests in trial court discretion)
State v. Yormark, 117 N.J. Super. 315 (App. Div. 1971) (permitting admission of acquitted-act evidence in limited circumstances where issues differ)
State v. Schlue, 129 N.J. Super. 351 (App. Div. 1974) (admitting acquitted-act evidence where it was probative of motive for distinct subsequent offense)