State v. J. Lackman
2017 MT 127
Mont.2017Background
- Jeffrey Lackman shot Mark Partelow in the head after a brief physical fight at Partelow’s home; both had used methamphetamine. Lackman fled the scene, wiped the gun, and a friend hid it.
- Lackman was arrested the next night, transported by officers, and later testified he intended to assert justifiable use of force (self-defense); record does not show whether he received Miranda warnings.
- At trial Lackman testified he feared Partelow would kill or severely beat him; he offered jury instructions on justifiable use of lethal force but requested one including the “forcible felony” alternative, which the district court refused.
- The court instructed the jury that deadly force is justified only when reasonably necessary to prevent imminent death or serious bodily harm. The jury was also instructed on burdens and elements of self-defense.
- The State cross‑examined Lackman about never telling his self‑defense story before trial; prosecutor repeatedly argued Lackman had not told anyone his story. Defense did not object at trial.
- Jury convicted Lackman of deliberate homicide; district court sentenced him to 90 years. On appeal, Lackman raised three issues: jury instruction omission (forcible felony), prosecutor comments on silence, and prosecutor’s misstatement of the lethal‑force element in closing.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether refusing to instruct on "forcible felony" alternative to justify lethal force was erroneous | Court correctly instructed on statutory self‑defense language and only required imminence and commensurate force | Lackman: forcible‑felony clause allows lethal force to prevent an attacker’s reasonable apprehension of serious bodily injury even absent imminent serious injury | Affirmed — court did not abuse discretion; instructions fully and fairly stated applicable law and record did not support broader instruction |
| Whether prosecutor’s comments on Lackman not telling police his story were plain error | Comments related to pre‑arrest silence and prior omissions; admissible for impeachment and not a Doyle violation | Lackman: prosecutor’s use of silence (pre‑ or post‑Miranda) violated due process/M. R. Evid. 403 and warranted plain error review | No plain error — comments related to pre‑arrest silence; post‑arrest Miranda status unclear but Montana precedent permits impeachment by pre‑Miranda silence when defendant testifies |
| Whether prosecutor’s misstatement in closing that deadly force requires a belief life (not serious bodily injury) was plain error | State: misstatement acknowledged but not prejudicial given correct instruction and context | Lackman: misstatement misstated law and prejudiced his right to fair trial | No plain error — instruction correctly stated law, prosecutor also stated the law correctly earlier, and defense counsel corrected the misstatement in closing; no substantial rights violated |
Key Cases Cited
- Dahms v. State, 252 Mont. 1, 825 P.2d 1214 (Mont. 1992) (interpreting requirement of imminence in justifiable use of force)
- Stone v. State, 266 Mont. 345, 880 P.2d 1296 (Mont. 1994) (force used must be commensurate with threat)
- Miller v. State, 290 Mont. 97, 966 P.2d 721 (Mont. 1998) (same principle re: proportionality of defensive force)
- Finley v. State, 276 Mont. 126, 915 P.2d 208 (Mont. 1996) (post‑arrest, post‑Miranda silence and impeachment principles)
- Fletcher v. Weir, 455 U.S. 603 (1982) (post‑arrest, pre‑Miranda silence may be examined when defendant testifies)
- Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976) (use of post‑Miranda silence for impeachment violates due process)
- Morsette v. State, 372 Mont. 38, 309 P.3d 978 (Mont. 2013) (impeachment use of defendant’s silence after arrest and after Miranda warnings violates due process)