State v. J.L.G.
190 A.3d 442
| N.J. | 2018Background
- Defendant J.L.G. was convicted of multiple sex‑offense counts based chiefly on his stepdaughter Bonnie's testimony and an audio recording she made of an abusive encounter; he appealed raising, among other issues, the admission of expert testimony on the Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome (CSAAS).
- At trial the State called Dr. Lynn Taska to explain CSAAS (five components: secrecy; helplessness; entrapment/accommodation; delayed/conflicted disclosure; retraction); the jury received the model CSAAS charge twice.
- The Court previously approved CSAAS testimony in State v. J.Q. (1993); since then many jurisdictions have wrestled with CSAAS reliability and scope.
- The Supreme Court remanded for a Frye‑style reliability hearing under N.J.R.E. 702; four experts testified and extensive literature was introduced on remand.
- The trial court on remand found limited scientific support and concluded only delayed disclosure has general acceptance; the Supreme Court reviewed de novo and reached the same conclusion.
- Applying the holding to this record, the Court found admission of CSAAS testimony erroneous but harmless given strong corroborating evidence (audio, recorded phone calls, witness observation) and affirmed convictions.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether CSAAS (as a five‑part "syndrome") is admissible under N.J.R.E. 702/Frye | State: CSAAS is generally accepted; it educates jurors about counterintuitive victim behaviors and can be tested via cross‑examination | J.L.G.: CSAAS is unreliable, not generally accepted, and intrudes on the jury’s role | CSAAS as a whole is not generally accepted and is inadmissible under Rule 702/Frye |
| Whether delayed disclosure (one CSAAS component) is admissible | State: delay, denial, recantation all occur and expert testimony helps explain delay | Defendant: jurors can understand delay; expert not necessary; delay evidence may be prejudicial | Delayed disclosure alone has sufficient scientific acceptance and may be admitted if Rule 702’s other prongs (expertise; beyond juror ken) are satisfied |
| Whether New Jersey should replace Frye with Daubert in criminal cases (raised by amici) | Amici/L.R. Exoneration Project: adopt Daubert as more rigorous reliability gatekeeper | State/others: do not ask Court to change; issue only raised by amici | Court declines to address; retains Frye for criminal‑case reliability analysis |
| Whether the erroneous admission of CSAAS testimony was reversible error in this case | Defendant: error was harmful and requires new trial | State: any error was harmless given strong corroborating evidence | Error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt given audio recording, recorded calls, witness observation; convictions affirmed |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. J.Q., 130 N.J. 554 (1993) (previously upheld admission of CSAAS evidence under New Jersey law)
- Kelly v. [State?] / State v. Kelly, 97 N.J. 178 (1984) (articulates N.J.R.E. 702 three‑part test for expert evidence)
- State v. Harvey, 151 N.J. 117 (1997) (applies Frye general acceptance test in criminal cases)
- Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923) (establishes general‑acceptance reliability standard)
- Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993) (federal standard for admissibility of scientific expert evidence; discussed but not adopted)