376 P.3d 132
Mont.2016Background
- Kline (father) was convicted by a Montana jury of criminal distribution of dangerous drugs, endangering the welfare of children, and incest for having sex with his 17‑year‑old biological daughter, S.K., and supplying her methamphetamine.
- S.K. testified she and Kline had consensual intercourse repeatedly for ~two months while she was 17 and used methamphetamine with him; her sister and medical/forensic witnesses corroborated drug use and behavioral signs consistent with sexual abuse.
- Before trial the State moved to bar Kline from arguing S.K. was an accomplice; the district court granted the motion, concluding S.K. was a victim and not legally accountable for Kline’s conduct.
- At trial Kline moved for acquittal on the incest count and requested a jury instruction to view S.K.’s testimony with distrust as an accountable witness; both requests were denied.
- On appeal Kline argued the district court erred by concluding S.K. was not legally accountable under Montana’s accountability statutes (so no corroboration or distrust instruction was required) and that the State failed to corroborate S.K.’s testimony.
- The Supreme Court of Montana affirmed: S.K. was not legally accountable for Kline’s commission of incest, and the State presented sufficient corroborating evidence for the incest conviction.
Issues
| Issue | Kline's Argument | State's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether S.K. was legally accountable (accomplice liability) for Kline's incest under §45‑2‑302 | S.K. was legally accountable for Kline’s conduct, triggering corroboration rule and distrust instruction | S.K. was not legally accountable; accountability does not apply to a co‑participant in incest | Held: S.K. was not legally accountable under §45‑2‑302; district court correctly barred accomplice argument and instruction |
| Whether §46‑16‑213 required corroboration of S.K.’s testimony because she was responsible or legally accountable | Corroboration required if S.K. was accountable/responsible for the same offense | Corroboration unnecessary as S.K. was not legally accountable; but other corroboration still needed if witness was "responsible" | Held: Although not legally accountable, S.K. was a participant; the State nonetheless produced sufficient corroborating evidence, so conviction stands |
| Whether jury should have been instructed to view S.K.’s testimony with distrust under §26‑1‑303(4) | Instruction required if S.K. was legally accountable | No instruction required because S.K. was not legally accountable | Held: No instruction required; trial court did not err |
| Whether accountability theory can apply to two participants in incest | Accountability can transfer culpability to co‑participant | Accountability generally applies to third parties who cause, solicit, or aid others; not to co‑participants who independently commit incest | Held: Accountability typically requires a third‑party facilitator; it does not apply to a co‑participant who independently commits incest |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Guill, 359 Mont. 225, 248 P.3d 826 (Mont. 2011) (third‑party convicted by accountability for facilitating incest between unrelated participants)
- State v. Henderson, 265 Mont. 454, 877 P.2d 1013 (Mont. 1994) (accountability overturned where alleged co‑participants did not commit the predicate offense of incest)
- State v. Harris, 294 Mont. 397, 983 P.2d 881 (Mont. 1999) (prosecutorial discretion to charge or not charge co‑participant does not establish accountability)
- People v. Tobias, 21 P.3d 758 (Cal. 2001) (minor is treated as a victim, not an accomplice, for incest involving someone under 18)