STATE v. IVEN
2014 OK CR 8
| Okla. Crim. App. | 2014Background
- Defendant Wade Iven was charged with kidnapping, endeavoring to commit an act of violence, assault with a dangerous weapon, and one misdemeanor count of domestic abuse; evidence arose after a warrantless arrest for domestic abuse.
- Deputies Smith and Spiva and Officer King responded to a domestic dispute call; Deputy Smith located the victim (B.H.) who had visible, recent injuries and described jumping from a moving vehicle during an altercation with Iven.
- Deputy Spiva located and arrested Iven about an hour later at the request of Deputy Smith; the arrest was made without a warrant under 22 O.S. § 196(6).
- Iven moved to suppress evidence arguing the arrest was unlawful under § 196(6) because Deputy Spiva neither personally observed the victim’s injuries nor was told about them by Deputy Smith.
- The trial court found Deputy Smith observed the injuries but also found (as a factual matter) that Smith did not communicate those observations to Spiva, granted the motion to suppress, and the State appealed.
Issues
| Issue | State's Argument | Iven's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Who bears burden to justify a warrantless misdemeanor arrest under statute | State: trial court erred placing burden on State; burden should not be on State | Iven: State must prove statutory exception applies only if required | Held: Burden is on State to prove the arrest falls within a § 196 exception (analogous to statutory constraints) |
| Whether the collective-knowledge (fellow-officer) doctrine may apply to statutory challenge under § 196(6) | State: doctrine applies to statutory misdemeanor-arrest challenges; Tenth Circuit extends doctrine to misdemeanors | Iven: doctrine is a Fourth Amendment construct and cannot override a statute that he says requires personal observation by arresting officer | Held: Doctrine applies; § 196(6) does not require the arresting officer personally observe injury; legislature intended officers to rely on collective investigations |
| Whether vertical collective-knowledge can justify Spiva’s arrest when he lacked personal knowledge of injuries | State: Spiva could rely on Deputy Smith’s request; legality rests on Smith’s knowledge | Iven: Because Smith didn’t communicate injuries to Spiva, arrest unlawful | Held: Vertical collective-knowledge controls; it is irrelevant whether Smith actually told Spiva the facts — Smith had probable cause, so his knowledge is imputed to Spiva |
| Whether trial court abused discretion in granting suppression | State: suppression was erroneous given collective-knowledge and Smith’s observations | Iven: trial court made factual finding that Smith did not communicate and thus suppression proper | Held: Trial court abused its discretion; suppression reversed and case remanded |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Chavez, 534 F.3d 1338 (10th Cir. 2008) (explains horizontal vs. vertical collective-knowledge frameworks)
- United States v. Wilkinson, 633 F.3d 938 (10th Cir. 2011) (applies collective-knowledge to misdemeanor stops)
- United States v. Duval, 742 F.3d 246 (6th Cir. 2014) (recognizes officers may act on information/directions from other officers)
- United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221 (1985) (permits reliance on another agency’s information and imputes the directing officer’s knowledge)
- Holt v. State, 506 P.2d 561 (Okla. Crim. App. 1973) (early recognition of fellow-officer rule)