STATE v. IVEN
2014 OK CR 8
| Okla. Crim. App. | 2014Background
- Wade Matthew Iven was charged with kidnapping, endeavoring to commit an act of violence, assault with a dangerous weapon, and one misdemeanor count of domestic abuse after a single incident; he was arrested about an hour after police received a domestic-disturbance call.
- Deputy Craig Smith located the alleged victim (B.H.), observed recent injuries (bleeding, swelling, bruises), and requested assistance to locate/arrest Iven.
- Deputy Lonnie Spiva (and Officer Buddy King) searched for Iven; Spiva arrested Iven near a car wash in Okeene on Smith’s request.
- Iven moved to suppress evidence, arguing under 22 O.S. § 196(6) that Spiva lacked personal knowledge of the victim’s recent injury and Smith did not communicate that information to Spiva, making the warrantless misdemeanor arrest unlawful.
- The district court found Smith observed the injuries but made a factual finding that Smith did not communicate those observations to Spiva, granted the motion to suppress, and excluded derivative evidence.
- The State appealed, asserting (1) an officer may rely on another officer’s instructions (vertical collective knowledge), (2) the collective-knowledge doctrine applies to misdemeanor domestic-abuse arrests under §196(6), and (3) the State did not bear the burden to justify the arrest (challenging the trial court’s allocation of burden).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (Iven) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the collective-knowledge/fellow-officer doctrine may justify a warrantless misdemeanor arrest | An officer may rely on another officer’s instructions so long as the directing officer had sufficient information; vertical collective knowledge imputes that knowledge | The statute (§196(6)) requires the arresting officer to personally observe the recent injury, so collective knowledge cannot satisfy the statutory requirement | The doctrine applies; vertical collective knowledge imputes Smith’s observations to Spiva, so arrest was lawful |
| Whether the collective-knowledge doctrine can be applied in a statutory (non-constitutional) challenge under 22 O.S. §196(6) | The doctrine is not limited to constitutional claims and is compatible with the statute’s text and §60.16’s investigative requirements | The statute’s plain language requires personal observation by the arresting officer and thus precludes the doctrine | The court held the statute does not require personal observation by the arresting officer and that the doctrine may be applied to statutory challenges |
| Who bears the burden to justify a warrantless misdemeanor arrest under §196 | The State must justify that the arrest falls within a statutory exception to the warrant requirement | Iven argued the State failed to prove Spiva personally observed the injury; trial court placed burden on State | The court held the burden properly rests with the State to prove the arrest fits a statutory exception |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221 (1985) (authorizes action based on information from another agency/officer where directing officer had sufficient information)
- United States v. Chavez, 534 F.3d 1338 (10th Cir. 2008) (explains horizontal vs. vertical collective-knowledge doctrines)
- Holt v. State, 506 P.2d 561 (Okla. Crim. App. 1973) (recognizes fellow-officer/collective-knowledge principle)
- Delgarza-Alzaga v. State, 36 P.3d 454 (Okla. Crim. App. 2001) (State bears burden to justify constitutionality of warrantless searches/seizures)
- State v. Ramos, 297 P.3d 1251 (Okla. Crim. App. 2013) (standard of appellate review for suppression rulings)