State v. Irish
298 Neb. 61
Neb.2017Background
- In March 2015, Bryant L. Irish was convicted under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 60-6,198 for causing serious bodily injury while driving under the influence (Class IIIA felony).
- § 60-6,198(1) requires the court, as part of the judgment of conviction, to order a driving prohibition of at least 60 days and up to 15 years and to revoke the offender’s license for the same period.
- At sentencing the court placed Irish on 60 months probation, ordered 180 days in jail (first 180 days to be served), and orally told him he could apply for an ignition interlock permit after 45 days of no driving; the written order did not reflect the interlock eligibility.
- Irish appealed (challenging sufficiency of evidence) and lost; later (Aug. 2016) he moved for a nunc pro tunc correction and then moved to modify or clarify his probation so the court would reduce the revocation period and permit interlock eligibility.
- The district court denied those motions, concluding it lacked authority to change the statutorily mandated revocation that was part of the judgment. Irish appealed the denial of the probation modification motion.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the sentencing court could modify the driver’s license revocation period by amending probation terms | Irish: § 29-2263(3) permits the court to modify probation conditions, so it could reduce the revocation period and permit interlock eligibility | State: The revocation under § 60-6,198 is a mandatory part of the judgment (not a probation condition); court lacks authority to change it via probation modification | Court: Held the revocation is part of the judgment and not a term of probation; court lacked jurisdiction to grant the untimely modification request |
| Whether the court’s oral pronouncement (interlock eligibility after 45 days) created an enforceable change to the written sentence | Irish: Bench statement reflected sentencing intent and should be enforced/clarified | State: Written judgment controls; statutory scheme does not authorize interlock for § 60-6,198 revocations | Court: The oral statement conflicted with the written judgment and statutory scheme; defendant failed to timely appeal the sentence, so challenge was untimely |
| Whether the district court had jurisdiction to consider the postjudgment motion to change sentence via probation | Irish: Postjudgment modification under probation statute is permissible | State: Criminal appeals must be perfected within 30 days; in criminal cases the judgment equals the sentence, and Irish did not appeal timely | Court: Held appellate jurisdiction was not vested because Irish did not perfect a timely appeal from the sentence |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Hense, 276 Neb. 313, 753 N.W.2d 832 (2008) (mandatory license revocation is part of sentence)
- State v. Bainbridge, 249 Neb. 260, 543 N.W.2d 154 (1996) (long revocation is part of punishment; executive commutation limits)
- State v. Philipps, 246 Neb. 610, 521 N.W.2d 913 (1994) (separation-of-powers limits on administrative interference with sentences)
- Shasta Linen Supply v. Applied Underwriters, 290 Neb. 640, 861 N.W.2d 425 (2015) (appellate jurisdictional principles)
- State v. McColery, 297 Neb. 53, 898 N.W.2d 349 (2017) (statutory interpretation precedent cited)
- State v. Robbins, 297 Neb. 503, 900 N.W.2d 745 (2017) (statutory interpretation precedent cited)
- State v. Donner, 13 Neb. App. 85, 690 N.W.2d 181 (2004) (license revocation as punishment, not probation condition)
- Dugan v. State, 297 Neb. 444, 900 N.W.2d 528 (2017) (criminal judgment = sentence for appeal timing)
