State v. Ireland
111 N.E.3d 468
| Ohio Ct. App. | 2017Background
- On Oct. 19, 2013, Darin K. Ireland assaulted Drew Coen outside Cappy’s Bar; Coen sustained severe facial and head injuries and a .30 BAC at the hospital. Ireland claimed no memory of the attack.
- Defense presented Dr. Reardon who opined Ireland experienced a PTSD-induced dissociative "blackout" (automatism) and acted involuntarily; State presented Dr. Eshbaugh to rebut.
- Ireland requested an OJI instruction on "blackout"; the trial court gave the instruction but labeled blackout an affirmative defense and instructed Ireland bore the burden to prove it by a preponderance.
- Jury convicted Ireland of felonious assault; court sentenced him to six years imprisonment.
- Ireland appealed, arguing (inter alia) the blackout instruction unconstitutionally shifted the burden of proof and violated the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt requirement.
- The appellate court reversed, holding voluntariness is an element the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt and that treating blackout as an affirmative defense was structural error requiring automatic reversal (limited to PTSD-induced blackout claims, not voluntary intoxication).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether "blackout" (automatism/unconsciousness) is an affirmative defense that defendant must prove by preponderance | State: trial court correctly treated blackout as affirmative defense and placed burden on Ireland to prove it by preponderance | Ireland: blackout negates the essential element of a voluntary act; State must prove voluntariness beyond a reasonable doubt | Court: voluntariness is an essential element; State must prove it beyond a reasonable doubt; labeling blackout as affirmative defense was structural error — conviction reversed |
| Whether the burden-shifting instruction affected the reasonable-doubt requirement and requires structural reversal | State: error (if any) was harmless or properly allocated under Ohio law | Ireland: instruction denied his constitutional right to a jury verdict beyond a reasonable doubt (Sullivan/Winship) | Court: because it undermined the State's obligation to prove an element beyond a reasonable doubt, error was structural and required reversal |
| Whether R.C. 2901.21(A) and Ohio caselaw permit requiring defendant to prove involuntariness | State: historical Ohio cases treated blackout as affirmative defense | Ireland: statutory actus-reus requirement makes voluntariness an element for prosecution to prove | Court: R.C. 2901.21(A) requires a voluntary act for criminal liability; voluntariness is an element the State must prove |
| Scope of decision — does it apply to intoxication-based defenses | State: the trial court excluded intoxication excuse from blackout instruction | Ireland: sought to distinguish PTSD-induced automatism from voluntary intoxication | Court: decision is limited to PTSD-induced blackout/automatism; does not affect voluntary-intoxication rules |
Key Cases Cited
- Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1 (1999) (harmless-error framework and limits on structural error)
- Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279 (1991) (definition and consequences of structural error)
- Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275 (1993) (defective reasonable-doubt instruction is structural error)
- In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) (Due Process requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime)
- Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977) (Due Process and allocation of burdens between elements and affirmative defenses)
- Lehman v. Haynam, 164 Ohio St. 595 (Ohio 1956) (civil precedent historically cited regarding unconsciousness defenses)
- State v. Nucklos, 121 Ohio St.3d 332 (Ohio 2009) (State must prove defendant engaged in a voluntary act with requisite culpability)