347 P.3d 1103
Wash. Ct. App.2015Background
- Terrance Irby was tried for James Rock’s 2005 beating and death; evidence linked Irby (neighbors, items with victim’s blood, victim’s weapons in Irby’s truck).
- Irby’s 2007 convictions were reversed by the Washington Supreme Court for a public-trial violation; on remand he proceeded pro se and voluntarily absented himself during voir dire at the 2013 retrial.
- During voir dire two seated jurors made statements suggestive of bias: Juror 38 said, unprompted, “I would like to say he’s guilty,” and Juror 27 expressed being “pro police officer” but later said she would “try” to be fair.
- Irby was convicted of premeditated first-degree murder, first-degree burglary, and felony murder; sentencing produced life without parole on aggravated murder (based on aggravators) and life without parole on burglary as a persistent offender.
- The court held: seating juror 38 (actual bias without follow-up) was manifest constitutional error requiring reversal and new trial; jury unanimity was lacking on the burglary count (two distinct acts presented without election or Petrich instruction), requiring reversal of burglary and felony-murder convictions; the State failed to prove aggravating factors and felony-murder, so those findings were dismissed with prejudice.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (Irby) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Juror bias (Juror 38, 27) | No forfeiture; voir dire adequate overall; group questions sufficient; no follow-up needed | Juror 38’s statement showed actual bias; failure to question was manifest constitutional error; juror 27 also biased | Reversed: Juror 38 demonstrated actual bias; seating her was manifest error requiring new trial; juror 27 was not clearly biased |
| Jury unanimity on burglary | Charge involved alternative means or the acts were part of same transaction; unanimity instruction unnecessary | State presented two separate unlawful entries (shop and upstairs bedroom); no election or Petrich instruction; jurors may not have agreed on same act | Reversed: Failure to give unanimity/Petrich instruction was not harmless; burglary and dependent felony-murder reversed |
| Sufficiency of evidence for aggravating circumstances | Evidence supported burglary-related and concealment aggravators as part of the transaction | Sequence of events not proved; burglary may have occurred after killing; concealment not established beyond speculation | Reversed with prejudice: State failed to prove aggravators; cannot retry on those aggravators; felony-murder also unsupported |
| Comparability of 1976 conviction as a strike | Historical conviction comparable or factual record shows age disparity sufficient | Information/ verdict from 1976 did not prove 36-month age gap; using court records to find age would violate Apprendi | Vacated strike use: 1976 conviction not proven factually comparable beyond jury findings; cannot be used to impose persistent-offender life term |
Key Cases Cited
- Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975) (right to impartial jury)
- Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) (facts increasing penalty must be found beyond a reasonable doubt)
- State v. Petrich, 101 Wn.2d 566 (1984) (jury unanimity requirement for the act underlying a single charge)
- State v. Kitchen, 110 Wn.2d 403 (1988) (unanimity and alternative means discussion)
- State v. Brett, 126 Wn.2d 136 (1995) (aggravators and concealment standard)
- State v. Hacheney, 160 Wn.2d 503 (2007) (felony-murder and timing/chronology requirement)
- Hughes v. United States, 258 F.3d 453 (6th Cir. 2001) (failure to follow up on juror’s explicit inability to be fair requires reversal)
- United States v. Gonzalez, 214 F.3d 1109 (9th Cir. 2000) (biased juror error not harmless)
- State v. Gonzales, 111 Wn. App. 276 (2002) (juror statements showing inability to apply presumption of innocence require excusal)
- State v. Lavery, 154 Wn.2d 249 (2005) (comparability test for prior convictions used as strikes)
- State v. Hickman, 135 Wn.2d 97 (1998) (remedy for insufficient evidence is dismissal with prejudice)