State v. Inman, 366 P.3d 721

Background

Defendant lived temporarily in a house where several children (J — alleged sodomy victim; E — harassment victim; Q and R — witnesses) played; Q observed defendant with his face near J’s exposed genital area and heard defendant ask to "lick her privates."
J (about 7) disclosed to a forensic interviewer that defendant licked her vagina; E reported defendant looking under her dress on occasions. Q and Dotson (forensic interviewer) also testified.
Detective McCourt interviewed children, coordinated a pretext call, and met with J shortly before trial; on direct exam he said follow‑up visits are to ensure witnesses can testify and to determine if a witness "was lying" or had told a "fib," and that he had not noted any inconsistencies in J’s statements.
Defendant did not object at trial to McCourt’s statements; jury convicted by nonunanimous verdicts (11–1 sodomy; 10–2 harassment); court imposed mandatory 300‑month sentence on sodomy count.
On appeal defendant argued McCourt’s testimony impermissibly vouched for J and the trial court erred in failing to strike it sua sponte (plain‑error review). The court assumed arguendo error but declined to exercise discretion to correct unpreserved error and affirmed.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (State)	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether McCourt’s testimony constituted impermissible vouching that the trial court plainly erred in failing to strike sua sponte	McCourt’s comments were, at most, an implicit credibility comment but could be admissible or invited by defense theory about repeated interviews; defense opened the door and may have strategically declined to object.	Testimony explicitly implied McCourt evaluated J as not "fibbing" and thus vouched for her credibility; trial court had duty to strike such vouching even without objection (plain error).	Court: Conceded testimony was "likely" an implicit credibility comment but declined to decide plain error; even assuming plain error, refused to exercise discretion to correct because error was not grave here, case had corroborating evidence, and defendant failed to preserve objection. Affirmed.
Whether testimony that J’s statements were consistent constituted impermissible vouching	Consistency testimony is generally permissible and does not amount to vouching.	Such consistency statements, when coupled with other comments, improperly bolstered credibility.	Court: Consistency alone is not vouching (citing Beauvais, Viranond); McCourt’s statement that he noted no inconsistencies was permissible and contextualized the brief problematic remark about "fibbing."
Whether appellate court should exercise discretion to correct unpreserved plain error	N/A (discretionary analysis)	N/A (argued reversal warranted)	Court: Applied Ailes/Fults/Vanornum factors — gravity, nature of case, preservation policy, ease of cure, ends of justice — and concluded the balance counseled against review: error was brief, not expert vouching, case had corroboration, and defendant could have avoided retrial by objecting at trial. Defendant’s remedy, if any, is collateral (post‑conviction).

Key Cases Cited

Ailes v. Portland Meadows, Inc., 312 Or 376 (1991) (factors governing whether to exercise discretion to review unpreserved error)
Vanornum v. State, 354 Or 614 (2013) (exercise plain‑error discretion only with "utmost caution")
Fults v. State, 343 Or 515 (2007) (requirement to articulate reasons when exercising discretion; consider judicial efficiency)
Peeples v. Lampert, 345 Or 209 (2008) (policies underlying preservation rule explained)
Corkill v. State, 262 Or App 543 (2014) (defining "true vouching" and when sua sponte exclusion is required)
Beauvais v. State, 357 Or 524 (2015) (consistency of statements generally does not amount to impermissible vouching)
Viranond v. State, 346 Or 451 (2009) (similar holding on consistency evidence)
Pergande v. State, 270 Or App 280 (2015) (admitting credibility comments by experts in credibility‑centric cases can be grave error requiring correction)
Milbradt v. State, 305 Or 621 (1988) (trial court should cut off elicitation of credibility opinions; foundational Milbradt principle)
Cox v. State, 337 Or 477 (2004) (declining to review multiple unpreserved errors where state could have avoided issue at trial)