State v. Immelt, 173 Wash. 2d 1

Immelt honked her car horn for 5–10 minutes in front of a neighbor’s house early morning, waking others.
Snohomish County Code prohibits ‘public disturbance noise,’ including horn honking for purposes other than public safety.
A police investigation occurred as Immelt’s neighbor filed a noise complaint; Immelt was arrested after a second horn blast.
She was charged under SCC 10.01.040(l)(d); a district court convicted, and the conviction was affirmed on appeal.
The Supreme Court granted review to challenge the horn ordinance under state and federal free speech grounds.
The Court held the horn ordinance overbroad, invalidating Immelt’s conviction and declining to save it with narrowing constructs.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Is SCC 10.01.040(l)(d) overbroad under the First Amendment and Washington Constitution?	Immelt argues the ordinance bans protected expressive horn honking.	Snohomish County contends the ordinance targets public disturbance noise with exemptions that avoid overbreadth.	Yes; the ordinance is overbroad and invalid as written.
Does horn honking constitute protected speech under Spence–Johnson analysis?	Horn honking can convey messages in context and thus be protected speech.	Horn honking is primarily conduct/noise; protection depends on context, not automatic speech.	The court acknowledged that some honking may be speech, but the issue is overbreadth; the statute sweeps protected activity.
Can a narrowing construction save the horn ordinance from overbreadth?	There is no reasonable narrowing to target only unprotected conduct.	The ordinance could be read with narrowing to exclude protected expressions.	No; the majority declines a valid narrowing construction that would save the ordinance.
Should the court proceed under overbreadth analysis or apply as-applied/other standards?	Overbreadth analysis is applicable to facial challenges to broad restrictions on expression.	Overbreadth should not subsume as-applied or noise-based regulation analyses; other doctrines may apply.	The majority applies overbreadth doctrine; the ordinance is invalid facially.

Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938) (First Amendment protections extend to state constitutions; speech and symbolic conduct considerations)
Bradburn v. N. Cent. Reg’l Library Dist., 168 Wn.2d 789 (2010) (overbreadth analysis parallels First Amendment approach)
City of Spokane v. Rothwell, 166 Wn.2d 872 (2009) (interpretation of constitutional provisions and ordinances; de novo review)
Members of City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789 (1984) (substantial overbreadth requires realistic danger to free expression)
United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285 (2008) (overbreadth balancing of protected vs. unprotected speech)
Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (conduct may be protected if imbued with communicative elements)
O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (clarifies when regulation of conduct with speech elements falls under lesser standard)
Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405 (1974) (intent to convey a particularized message and likelihood of understanding determine speech status)
Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104 (1972) (conduct aimed to annoy or alarm can be unprotected unless expressive)
Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Boston, 515 U.S. 557 (1995) (parades as inherently expressive; context matters for speech protection)