State v. Ichimura, SCWC-13-0000396

Defendant Deirdre Ichimura, a diagnosed schizophrenic, was charged with second-degree assault against a law enforcement officer for kicking an officer during an arrest on an outstanding warrant.
At trial Ichimura did not testify; defense counsel presented the mother who testified defendant is treated by a psychiatrist and takes medication and denied seeing any kicks.
Officer Santiago testified over objection that, based on observation and training, Ichimura "appeared to be more on drugs than having a mental illness," and also opined that the court issuing the warrant "would have been made aware if [Ichimura] had a mental illness." The defense objected to foundation and speculation.
The trial court allowed both statements (limiting the first to officer perception) and denied striking the second; the jury convicted Ichimura and she was sentenced.
On appeal the ICA upheld admission of the first statement and found the second inadmissible but harmless; the Hawai‘i Supreme Court granted certiorari.
The Hawai‘i Supreme Court held the officer’s statements were improperly admitted (first lacked adequate foundation and relevance; second was speculative) and, independently, that the trial court failed to conduct a proper on-the-record Tachibana colloquy regarding Ichimura’s right to testify, warranting vacatur and remand.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Officer Santiago could testify that Ichimura "appeared more on drugs than having a mental illness."	Admission proper as perception evidence explaining officers’ reactions; based on training and observations.	Testimony lacked foundation, was speculative, and not relevant to explain officer conduct.	Court: Admission was improper—insufficient foundation and not relevant to justify his actions; should have been excluded.
Whether officer could testify that the issuing court "would have been made aware" of a mental illness.	(State conceded speculative but argued any error harmless.)	Testimony was speculative and should have been stricken.	Court: Statement was speculative and improperly admitted; not saved by harmlessness because other errors required reversal.
Whether trial court conducted a proper Tachibana colloquy and obtained on-the-record waiver of right to testify.	State conceded the end-of-trial colloquy did not comply with Tachibana but argued other errors harmless.	Colloquy was inadequate given defendant’s mental-health evidence and equivocal responses; no knowing, intelligent waiver.	Court: Colloquy was inadequate; waiver not knowing/intelligent given salient facts (mental illness, uncertain responses); error was not harmless—conviction vacated and case remanded.

Tachibana v. State, [citation="79 Hawai'i 226, 900 P.2d 1293"] (1995) (trial courts must advise defendants of right to testify and obtain on-the-record waiver)
State v. Staley, [citation="91 Hawai'i 275, 982 P.2d 904"] (1999) (waiver of constitutional rights must be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary)
State v. Han, [citation="130 Hawai'i 83, 306 P.3d 128"] (2013) (colloquy must reflect an actual exchange to ensure understanding; pretrial advisements may be inadequate if no audible response)
State v. Pomroy, [citation="132 Hawai'i 85, 319 P.3d 1093"] (2014) (failure to engage defendant in dialogue undermines on-the-record waiver)
State v. Miller, [citation="122 Hawai'i 92, 223 P.3d 157"] (2010) (plain error affecting substantial rights may be noticed sua sponte)
State v. Hoang, [citation="94 Hawai'i 271, 12 P.3d 371"] (2000) (difficulty of assessing effect of right-to-testify violations; convictions must be vacated unless harmless beyond a reasonable doubt)
United States v. Duarte-Higareda, 113 F.3d 1000 (9th Cir. 1997) (salient facts like mental illness or language barrier require more searching colloquy to ensure voluntariness)