269 P.3d 1023
Wash.2012Background
- Hurst was charged with assault in the third degree, but competency to stand trial was raised and he was committed to Western State Hospital for competency restoration.
- He underwent two 90-day competency restoration periods, after which he remained incompetent for a third potential period.
- The trial court sought to commit him for up to 180 days in a third mental health treatment and restoration period based on a jury finding.
- RCW 10.77.086(4) allows a third period if there is substantial probability of restoration and dangerousness or likelihood of future dangerous acts.
- Hurst argued the Due Process Clause requires clear, cogent, and convincing evidence to support the third commitment, i.e., a higher standard than preponderance of the evidence.
- The court concluded the preponderance standard suffices and affirmed the Court of Appeals.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Does Due Process require clear, cogent, convincing evidence for the third commitment? | Hurst. | State. | No; preponderance suffices. |
Key Cases Cited
- Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437 (1992) (due process framework for competency determinations in criminal contexts)
- Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) (Medina framework; due process balancing framework not used here)
- Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972) (detention of incompetent defendant limited to reasonable period to determine restoration probability)
- Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348 (1996) (due process limits on requiring clear and convincing evidence for incompetence)