137 A.3d 689
R.I.2016Background
- Defendant Daniel Hunt was charged with two counts of second-degree child molestation arising from allegations that, on April 7, 2012, he touched a 12-year-old girl ("Emily") twice during a single visit: once for ~20 minutes, then again for ~10 minutes after briefly leaving.
- Both counts in the information were identically worded (same date, victim, and statute). Defendant did not request a bill of particulars.
- At trial the prosecutor, victim, and defense counsel repeatedly described the events as two separate incidents ("first" and "second" touching).
- The trial justice instructed the jury to treat each count separately and to find two separate acts of sexual contact; defense counsel did not object to the instructions or the verdict form.
- During deliberations the jury asked to review testimony about the second touching and what happened after the first incident; the transcript excerpts were read to the jury and no objections were made.
- The jury returned a split verdict: guilty as to count 1 and not guilty as to count 2. Defendant moved for a new trial and appealed, arguing the jury was not adequately informed of the distinction between the identically worded counts.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (Hunt) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether trial justice erred by failing to differentiate identically worded counts in jury instructions and verdict form | Jury was properly instructed to treat each count as a separate alleged act; record shows jury understood and distinguished the two incidents | Failure to adequately inform jury of distinction deprived defendant of notice and violated his constitutional right to be informed of charges | No reversible error; instructions + record show jury treated counts as distinct and no juror confusion was shown |
| Whether defendant waived the right to challenge the instructions/verdict form by failing to object at trial | Raise-or-waive rule applies; no timely objection was made and no novel constitutional error was invoked | Counsel preserved error by raising in motion for new trial; appellate review warranted | Issue waived on appeal under Rule 30; no narrow exception applicable |
| Whether lack of bill of particulars forecloses complaint about identical counts | Defendant could have sought bill of particulars to clarify separate incidents; failure to do so undermines complaint | Identically worded counts made clarity impossible without court guidance | Failure to seek bill of particulars weighs against defendant; not a basis for reversal |
| Whether jury unanimity or polling shows understanding of verdict | Unanimous polling on count 1 and juror questions focusing on the second incident indicate comprehension | Jury may have been confused by identical wording despite polling | Court presumes jurors followed instructions; record supports no confusion |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Davis, 877 A.2d 642 (R.I. 2005) (failure to request bill of particulars and to object to jury instructions forfeits appellate challenge absent constitutional error)
- State v. Vargas, 991 A.2d 1056 (R.I. 2010) (jury instructions reviewed de novo; reversal only if jury could have been misled)
- State v. Prefontaine, 667 A.2d 531 (R.I. 1995) (new trial granted where jury and trial court were hopelessly confused about offenses charged)
- State v. Saluter, 715 A.2d 1250 (R.I. 1998) (bill of particulars supplies omitted factual detail; convictions vacated where counts alleged separate incidents but jury confused)
- State v. Mendez, 116 A.3d 228 (R.I. 2015) (discusses narrow exception to raise-or-waive rule for novel constitutional errors)