State v. Humpal, 2017 SD 82

Charles Humpal pleaded guilty in 2014 to possession and unauthorized ingestion; sentenced to three years on each count with execution suspended and three years of probation (Criminal File 13-2946).
Probation violation proceedings occurred in 2016; probation was continued by amended judgment to run from that date.
In October 2016 Humpal pled guilty to grand theft in a separate file; the State agreed not to file a probation violation in 13-2946 as part of the plea deal.
On March 7, 2017 the sentencing court imposed a five-year penitentiary sentence (three years suspended) for grand theft and ordered it to run concurrent with the sentence in 13-2946.
The court later (March 9, 2017) discharged Humpal from probation in 13-2946; Humpal appealed claiming the March 7 sentence illegally subjected him to dual supervision by the judicial (probation) and executive (DOC/parole) branches.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the court had authority to impose a penitentiary sentence while Humpal was serving probation in a different case	State: issue moot because Humpal was discharged from probation and now only under executive supervision	Humpal: March 7 sentence violated separation of powers by placing him under simultaneous judicial and executive supervision; March 9 discharge doesn’t cure the constitutional error	The March 7 sentence initially created improper dual supervision, but the subsequent probation discharge eliminated the live controversy; court affirms sentence as Humpal is now under only executive supervision
Whether SDCL 23A-27-18.4 authorized running the new penitentiary sentence concurrent to a separate partially-suspended sentence	State: court could rely on SDCL 23A-27-18.4 to run sentences concurrent	Humpal: statute inapplicable because he was not an entirely-suspended concurrent defendant but was on active probation in a different file	Court: SDCL 23A-27-18.4 did not justify simultaneous judicial/executive supervision; ordering concurrence did not cure the error, but subsequent discharge rendered the sentence constitutional in practice

State v. Oban, 372 N.W.2d 125 (1985) (sentencing power derives from statute and constitution)
State v. Kramer, 754 N.W.2d 655 (2008) (statutory interpretation reviewed de novo)
State v. Burdick, 712 N.W.2d 5 (2006) (principles for statutory interpretation)
State v. Orr, 871 N.W.2d 834 (2015) (South Dakota law precludes simultaneous supervision by judicial and executive branches)
In re Woodruff, 567 N.W.2d 226 (1997) (mootness doctrine where change in circumstances makes relief impossible)
Rapid City Journal v. Seventh Judicial Cir. Ct., 283 N.W.2d 563 (1979) (mootness and justiciability principles)
Cummings v. Mickelson, 495 N.W.2d 493 (1993) (public interest exception to mootness)
Wheeldon v. Madison, 374 N.W.2d 367 (1985) (public interest exception framework)
Sedlacek v. S.D. Teener Baseball Program, 437 N.W.2d 866 (1989) (criteria for retaining moot cases due to public importance)