State v. Huerta-Castro
2017 NMCA 26
| N.M. Ct. App. | 2016Background
- Defendant was indicted on twelve counts of criminal sexual penetration of a minor (CSPM): six identical counts as to Child 1 and six identical counts as to Child 2, each alleging acts occurring "on, about or between August 15, 2012 and October 13, 2012."
- Defendant moved for a bill of particulars seeking time/date/location particulars for each count; the district court denied the motion, relying on the possibility that later interviews/discovery would supply specificity.
- At trial both children testified to repeated penetrative acts by Defendant (more than six times each) but gave almost no specific dates or incidents; limited testimony tied one incident to "a day before school started." Medical exam by a pediatrician (done after disclosure issues) found no physical injuries but the pediatrician testified the histories were consistent with sexual abuse.
- The State produced late discovery: the pediatrician’s report just before trial and a multi‑page U‑Visa application and supporting letters (identifying DA and police involvement) only after judicial ordering. Defense objected to the late disclosure and sought dismissal.
- The jury convicted Defendant on all twelve counts. On appeal the court considered (1) adequacy of the indictment/bill of particulars and due process/double jeopardy risk from undifferentiated "cookie‑cutter" counts; (2) sufficiency of evidence; (3) alleged Brady violations (pediatrician report and U‑Visa materials); and (4) cumulative error.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Adequacy of charging documents / denial of bill of particulars | State argued broad time‑frame counts are permissible in child abuse cases and later discovery/interviews would supply needed detail. | Defendant argued identical, undifferentiated counts deprived him of fair notice, prevented preparation of defense, and risked double jeopardy; requested statement of facts. | Court reversed the denial: district court erred by relying on later discovery instead of applying the Baldonado framework; undifferentiated multiple counts permit at most a single course‑of‑conduct count per victim. Ten counts reversed/dismissed. |
| Sufficiency of evidence to support multiple counts / double jeopardy | State argued children testified to repeated acts supporting multiple counts within charged period. | Defendant argued proof did not tie distinct incidents to specific counts or charged dates; at most a single course‑of‑conduct count per child was supported. | Court held evidence supported only one course‑of‑conduct conviction per child (two counts total); other counts lacked requisite distinguishing facts and risked double jeopardy. |
| Brady: pediatrician report (late disclosure) | State contended report disclosed during trial and not withheld throughout trial; late disclosure did not warrant reversal absent material prejudice. | Defendant argued late disclosure prevented pretrial investigation, expert consultation, and effective cross‑examination of the pediatrician. | Court found suppression was error but that report was not shown to be favorable or materially prejudicial given defendant ultimately called the pediatrician and failed to seek continuance; no reversal on that ground alone. |
| Brady: U‑Visa application and supporting letters (late disclosure) | State initially denied knowledge, later produced full application after court order and asserted documents did not materially alter fairness. | Defendant argued U‑Visa materials were impeachment evidence showing motive/bias by Mother (a key witness) and were withheld by prosecution and law‑enforcement team members—material and favorable under Brady. | Court concluded production was suppressed, the evidence was favorable and material (could have affected credibility/impeachment of central witnesses), and, when combined with other errors, contributed to prejudice; cumulative error required new trial on the two permissible counts. |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Baldonado, 124 N.M. 745, 955 P.2d 214 (N.M. Ct. App. 1998) (sets framework for when bill of particulars is required in child abuse prosecutions; court must scrutinize and narrow time frame using available non‑evidentiary facts)
- State v. Dominguez, 143 N.M. 549, 178 P.3d 834 (N.M. Ct. App. 2008) (multiple indistinguishable counts over a time period support no more than a single course‑of‑conduct conviction per victim)
- State v. Graves, 73 N.M. 79, 385 P.2d 635 (N.M. 1963) (error in denying bill of particulars requires reversal; bill must supply basic information, not evidence)
- Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (U.S. 1963) (prosecution must disclose evidence favorable to accused)
- United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (U.S. 1985) (materiality standard for suppressed evidence: reasonable probability that result would differ)
- Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 (U.S. 1995) (Brady duty extends to favorable evidence known to others acting on the government's behalf)
- State v. Tafoya, 147 N.M. 602, 227 P.3d 92 (N.M. Ct. App. 2010) (reversal required where undifferentiated counts of penetration violated defendant’s rights; pattern‑of‑conduct counts may be used when specifics lack)
Summary of disposition: Ten of twelve convictions reversed and dismissed; remand for retrial on two counts (one course‑of‑conduct count per child) because cumulative errors—particularly the withheld U‑Visa impeachment evidence plus procedural failures on specificity—deprived Defendant of a fair trial.