346 P.3d 1062
Kan.2015Background
- In July 2009 Hudgins, while fleeing a marked patrol car at very high speeds (up to ~120 mph) with headlights off, rear-ended another vehicle, killing two occupants; his BAC was .15.
- State charged Hudgins with two counts of first-degree felony murder (underlying felony: fleeing/attempting to elude) and one count of fleeing/attempting to elude; jury convicted on all counts; sentence included two concurrent hard-20 terms and a consecutive 6-month term.
- Extensive pretrial juror questionnaire (18 pages) was used; over 120 venire members summoned, ~62 were questioned, 42 passed for cause, and 12 jurors + 2 alternates were seated.
- Trial court limited defense voir dire time, made remarks in front of the venire about pacing, denied Hudgins’ motions to change venue based on pretrial publicity, and excluded evidence regarding the pursuing deputy’s departmental pursuit policy (defense proffer was minimal).
- Prosecutor misstated the law in closing by implying jurors had to unanimously conclude Hudgins was not guilty of felony murder before considering lesser-included offenses; the court found the comment erroneous but harmless given overwhelming evidence.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Voir dire time limits | Court may set reasonable limits; K.S.A. 22-3408(3) permits curtailing harassment/delay | Hudgins: limits cut off "searching" questioning, violated Sixth Amendment and Kansas Const. art. 10 | Court: no abuse of discretion and no prejudice; limits addressed delay and questionnaire provided ample info |
| Court remarks to counsel/venire | Court: comments were management to control pace and inform jurors | Hudgins: remarks were disparaging and prejudicial | Court: remarks were not demeaning or partial; within discretion and not prejudicial |
| Change of venue for pretrial publicity | Hudgins: publicity (including civil trial coverage) made fair trial unlikely | State: jurors screened, many impartiality assurances, eased selection | Court: applied Higgenbotham/Roeder factors; no demonstrable community prejudice; denial not an abuse of discretion |
| Prosecutorial comments re: lesser-includeds | State: argument intended to explain ordering; jury instructions governed law | Hudgins: prosecutor misstated law, implying unanimity required to consider lessers, was reversible error | Court: prosecutor’s statement was ambiguous and erroneous but not gross/flagrant; harmless error given strong evidence of guilt |
| Exclusion of evidence re: pursuit policy | Hudgins: policy violation relevant to causation and defense | State: policy irrelevant to whether defendant fled and caused deaths | Court: Hudgins failed to make an adequate proffer of the policy or evidence; issue not preserved for review |
| Charging felony murder vs. DUI manslaughter | Hudgins: should have been charged with more specific DUI manslaughter statute | State: felony murder (with fleeing underlying felony) is proper alternative charge | Court: DUI manslaughter is not the more specific statute here; statutes require proof of different elements; charging was proper |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Hayes, 258 Kan. 629 (trial court has broad discretion over voir dire)
- State v. Pioletti, 246 Kan. 49 (reversal requires abuse of discretion and prejudice for voir dire limits)
- State v. Hurt, 278 Kan. 676 (prosecutor may not require unanimity to acquit before considering lessers; ambiguous statements analyzed for prejudice)
- State v. Roeder, 300 Kan. 901 (standard for change of venue based on pretrial publicity)
- State v. Higgenbotham, 271 Kan. 582 (factors for assessing actual prejudice from publicity)
- State v. Williams, 250 Kan. 730 (analysis of general vs. specific statute charging)
- State v. Helms, 242 Kan. 511 (State’s charging discretion when statutes overlap)