500 P.3d 728
Or. Ct. App.2021Background
- Three people overdosed from fentanyl traced to a container in defendant Brian Hubbell’s hotel-room belongings; police later found large quantities of white powder (fentanyl) in multiple small baggies in Hubbell’s room.
- Hubbell was incarcerated when the search occurred; he told police he possessed the fentanyl but denied distributing it.
- He was charged with possession and delivery of a Schedule II controlled substance; at bench trial the court convicted him of delivery based on a Boyd theory (possession in large quantity + prepackaging can establish delivery).
- On appeal the panel asked the parties to brief whether State v. Boyd’s importation of ORS 161.405’s inchoate-attempt test into the statutory definition of “delivery” was consistent with statutory text, context, and legislative intent.
- The court concluded Boyd was plainly wrong: “attempted transfer” in ORS 475.005(8) means an unsuccessful/ incomplete transfer (an act), not the inchoate crime of attempt (a substantive offense).
- Because the evidence showed a substantial step toward distribution but did not show an actual, constructive, or attempted transfer, the court reversed the delivery conviction, entered (remanded to enter) a conviction for attempted delivery, and remanded for resentencing.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (Hubbell) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Boyd correctly treated the word “attempted” in ORS 475.005(8) as the inchoate-crime definition in ORS 161.405 | Boyd is correct because the legislature intended to criminalize possession with intent to distribute and would have understood “attempt” as the recently enacted inchoate-attempt concept | Boyd is inconsistent with the criminal code structure; “attempted transfer” should have its ordinary meaning (an unsuccessful transfer act) | Overruled Boyd: ORS 161.405 is not a general definitional provision; Boyd was plainly wrong |
| If Boyd is wrong, what does “attempted transfer” mean in ORS 475.005(8)? | (State) Even under the ordinary meaning the facts here would show an attempted transfer because of large quantity and prepackaging | (Hubbell) “Attempted transfer” requires an effort to cause the drugs to pass to another (identifiable effort/recipient/plan), which is lacking here | “Attempted transfer” means an unsuccessful/incomplete effort to transfer the substance (ordinary meaning modifies the act “transfer”) |
| Whether the evidence was sufficient to support a completed delivery conviction | The amount, packaging, and circumstances show intent and satisfy the relevant standard (and would under Boyd) | The evidence showed possession and intent but not an actual, constructive, or attempted transfer; therefore insufficient for delivery | Evidence insufficient for completed delivery but sufficient to prove a substantial step toward delivery (attempt in the inchoate sense) |
| Appropriate disposition if delivery conviction cannot stand | State: affirm under ordinary meaning or at least remand without vacating drug-related findings | Hubbell: judgment of acquittal on delivery; conviction only for possession | Court reverses the delivery conviction, directs entry of conviction for attempted delivery (lesser‑included), and remands for resentencing |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Boyd, 92 Or App 51, 756 P.2d 1276 (Or. Ct. App. 1988) (originally held possession with intent + prepackaging could satisfy delivery by importing ORS 161.405; now overruled)
- State v. Stockert, 303 Or App 314, 464 P.3d 151 (Or. Ct. App. 2020) (refused to import ORS 161.405 into a substantive statute; distinguished ordinary use of “attempt”)
- State v. Rapp, 306 Or App 265, 473 P.3d 1126 (Or. Ct. App. 2020) (held the presence of the word “attempt” in a substantive statute does not automatically import inchoate‑attempt elements)
- State v. O’Hare, 309 Or App 357, 481 P.3d 953 (Or. Ct. App. 2021) (explained ORS 161.405 delineates inchoate‑attempt elements rather than defining the word “attempt” across all statutes)
- State v. Civil, 283 Or App 395, 388 P.3d 1185 (Or. Ct. App. 2017) (articulated the “plainly wrong” standard for overruling prior statutory‑interpretation precedent)
- State v. Walters, 311 Or 80, 804 P.2d 1164 (Or. 1991) (describes the “substantial step” test for the inchoate crime of attempt)
- State v. Fulmer, 105 Or App 334, 804 P.2d 515 (Or. Ct. App. 1991) (applied Boyd’s approach to equate attempted delivery with completed delivery)
