State v. Howell, 924 N.W.2d 349

Police investigated a string of motorcycle thefts; a confidential informant told Officer Gratz that Howell took a motorcycle from 42nd & Adams to a garage on N. 27th and had "cut that motorcycle into pieces."
Gratz observed a black motorcycle at the N. 27th residence, spoke with Howell at the house, and later spoke with lessees Jason Mayr and Amanda Vocasek.
Mayr and Vocasek located a garage key and signed written consent forms; officers searched the detached garage ~45–60 minutes after Howell left.
The search uncovered Fleischman’s stolen motorcycle disassembled into pieces, two stolen bicycles, tools, compressors, and strong vehicle-paint odor.
Howell was tried, testified in his own defense, convicted of theft by unlawful taking, sentenced, and appealed, challenging suppression, hearsay rulings, mistrial denials, evidence admissions, limitation on his testimony about a prior felony, jury instructions, and denial of a new trial.

Issue	Howell's Argument	State's Argument	Held
Motion to suppress: consent to garage search	Mayr/Vocasek consent was coerced; therefore search invalid	Consent was voluntary under totality of circumstances; officers did not coerce	Denial affirmed; court found consent voluntary and trial court credibility rulings not clearly erroneous
Admission of CI and officer hearsay (Gratz testimony)	Testimony about CI and other officers was hearsay and prejudicial	Testimony about CI was offered only to explain why Gratz went to the address (non‑hearsay purpose); other-officer statement harmless	Admission upheld: CI testimony admitted for limited purpose (jury instructed); other-officer comment harmless cumulative evidence
Motions for mistrial for CI references	References to CI in opening/closing prejudiced jury	References were permitted because testimony was admissible for limited purpose	Motions denied; no abuse of discretion
Admission of evidence of two stolen bicycles	Bicycles were unrelated other‑acts and prejudicial; State failed to prove connection	Evidence was inextricably intertwined with the charged offense and relevant to chop‑shop theory	Admitted: bicycles were part of the factual setting and necessary for coherent presentation

State v. Wells, 290 Neb. 186 (discussing standard for review of suppression rulings)
State v. Tucker, 262 Neb. 940 (consent and warrantless-search principles)
State v. Prahin, 235 Neb. 409 (consent must be voluntary; consider subtle coercion)
State v. Ready, 252 Neb. 816 (totality-of-circumstances test for consent)
State v. DeGroat, 244 Neb. 764 (appellate deference to suppression factual findings)
State v. Schwaderer, 296 Neb. 932 (standard for hearsay-admissibility review)
State v. Baker, 280 Neb. 752 (out-of-court statements not hearsay if offered for nontruth purpose)
State v. Burries, 297 Neb. 367 (harmless-error review for erroneously admitted evidence)
State v. Castillo-Zamora, 289 Neb. 382 (scope of impeachment under Neb. Evid. R. 609)
State v. Daugherty, 215 Neb. 45 (prior-conviction inquiry limited to existence of conviction; no details)