State v. Houston, 467 S.W.3d 894

Defendant Dwayne Houston was convicted by a jury of first-degree burglary, attempted forcible rape, and second‑degree sexual misconduct based on an incident where the victim awoke to an intruder in her bed, fled, and later observed the intruder masturbating outside her home.
At voir dire the panel was asked if anyone knew the defendant; one juror admitted possible acquaintance and was struck for cause; Juror Rose Clemons did not disclose knowing Houston and stated she could be fair.
During trial the victim testified she moved out of her home the day after the incident and left the city/state; defense objected to questions about the victim’s moving but the court allowed limited inquiry.
After conviction and at sentencing defense counsel first asserted that Houston had dated Juror Clemons and that she had contacted his family; no affidavits or witness testimony was presented in support at that time.
The trial court denied the new‑trial motion and sentenced Houston to concurrent terms (17 years on felony counts). Houston appealed, challenging (1) admission of the victim’s testimony about moving and (2) failure to hold a hearing on alleged juror misconduct.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (State)	Defendant's Argument (Houston)	Held
Admissibility of testimony that victim moved after the attack	Testimony is circumstantial evidence of post‑attack psychological state and bears on lack of consent; thus relevant and probative	Testimony was irrelevant, prejudicial, and had no probative value to charged offenses	Court affirmed admission: evidence relevant to consent; not outcome‑determinative prejudice
Failure to hold evidentiary hearing on alleged juror relationship	Juror nondisclosure was not proven with affidavits/testimony; defendant failed to raise claim timely; trial court credited juror’s silence at voir dire	Claimed juror Clemons knew defendant and did not disclose; sought hearing after verdict/sentencing request	Court found claim waived/sandbagging; no plain error—defendant failed to present timely evidence or affidavits

State v. Anderson, 76 S.W.3d 275 (Mo. banc 2002) (standard for relevance and abuse‑of‑discretion review on evidence admission)
State v. Burke, 719 S.W.2d 887 (Mo. App. E.D. 1986) (post‑attack psychological evidence admissible to prove lack of consent)
State v. Dowell, 25 S.W.3d 594 (Mo. App. W.D. 2000) (evidence tending to prove elements of charged crime is relevant)
State v. Johnson, 637 S.W.2d 157 (Mo. App. E.D. 1982) (victim’s major life changes after assault relevant to consent)
State v. Evans, 455 S.W.3d 452 (Mo. App. E.D. 2014) (definition of prejudicial error requiring effect on trial outcome)
State v. Black, 50 S.W.3d 778 (Mo. banc 2001) (outcome‑determinative prejudice standard)
State v. Floyd, 347 S.W.3d 115 (Mo. App. E.D. 2011) (plain‑error review framework)
State v. Ess, 453 S.W.3d 196 (Mo. banc 2015) (juror duty to answer voir dire fully; silence can establish nondisclosure)
State v. Mayes, 63 S.W.3d 615 (Mo. banc 2001) (new trial appropriate for intentional nondisclosure or prejudice from unintentional nondisclosure; affidavit/testimony required)
State v. Baumruk, 280 S.W.3d 600 (Mo. banc 2009) (requirement to raise juror qualification objections promptly; anti‑sandbagging principle)
State v. White, 247 S.W.3d 557 (Mo. App. E.D. 2007) (plain error requires decisive effect on verdict)