8 N.M. Ct. App. 200
N.M. Ct. App.2015Background
- Anthony Holt was seen by homeowner Carolyn Stamper removing an exterior aluminum window screen; Stamper was inside with the inner window partially open and curtains partially drawn.
- Stamper testified the screen was halfway removed, required tools to remove, was damaged, and that Holt had his fingers "in that area between the window and the screen."
- Holt turned and left after noticing Stamper; no evidence he passed fully into the interior beyond the inner window sash.
- A jury convicted Holt of one count of breaking and entering under NMSA 1978, § 30-14-8(A); Holt appealed arguing (1) the statute does not cover intrusion into the space between a screen and a window, and (2) insufficient evidence he entered that space.
- The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that penetration into the space between a screen and the window can constitute "entry" when the screen forms part of the enclosure, and that Stamper's testimony provided sufficient evidence of such intrusion.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the breaking-and-entering statute covers intrusion into space between a window screen and an inner window | The State: statute protects enclosed spaces of dwellings; a screen can form part of the enclosure and thus penetration beyond it is "entry." | Holt: "entry" requires crossing into the interior beyond the last barrier (the inner window/sash); the statute is ambiguous and must be construed for defendant. | Held: A screen that reasonably encloses protected space can define the structure's outer boundary; intrusion into space behind the screen is "entry." |
| Whether the evidence was sufficient to prove entry into the space between screen and window | The State: homeowner's testimony that defendant had fingers between the screen and window and was removing the screen supported conviction. | Holt: challenged sufficiency—no proof he actually intruded into that space. | Held: Viewing evidence in the light most favorable to verdict, Stamper's testimony was sufficient to permit a rational jury to find intrusion and dismantling of the screen. |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Muqqddin, 285 P.3d 622 (N.M. 2012) (interpreting "entry" and holding prohibited space must be an enclosed area; cautions against judicially expanding burglary reach)
- People v. Valencia, 46 P.3d 920 (Cal. 2002) (held penetration behind a window screen may constitute entry; screen is part of outer boundary)
- People v. Nible, 247 Cal. Rptr. 396 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988) (screen is a permanent part of dwelling and penetration beyond it can be burglary entry)
- Commonwealth v. Burke, 467 N.E.2d 846 (Mass. 1984) (treats outer window coverings as part of dwelling; placing hand between storm and inner window supports entry)
- State v. Chappell, 193 S.E. 924 (S.C. 1937) (screen is an enclosing part of dwelling; tearing screen and inserting hand constituted breaking and entry)
- State v. Pigques, 310 S.W.2d 942 (Mo. 1958) (contrasting view: entry requires breach of last barrier to interior; intrusion into intermediate space may be attempted burglary)
- Miller v. State, 187 So. 2d 51 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1966) (entry into airspace between outer and inner barriers can suffice for burglary when intrusion into that airspace is necessary to reach inner barrier)