State v. Holt, 352 P.3d 702

Defendant Anthony Holt was seen from inside Stamper’s home removing an exterior aluminum window screen; Stamper testified the screen was halfway off and that Holt’s fingers were “in that area between the window and the screen.”
The window behind the screen was open a few inches and Stamper was inside; Holt looked up, said “I’m sorry,” and left without penetrating the glass or entering further.
Stamper testified the screen was destroyed and she was frightened; a jury convicted Holt of breaking and entering under NMSA 1978, § 30-14-8(A).
On appeal Holt argued (1) the statute requires entry into the interior of a structure (beyond the last barrier), so intrusion between screen and window is not covered, and (2) the evidence was insufficient to show he entered the space behind the screen.
The Court of Appeals analyzed statutory purpose and precedent about what constitutes ‘‘entry’’ and the nature of an enclosure and affirmed Holt’s conviction.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether ‘‘entry’’ under the breaking-and-entering statute includes intrusion into the space between a window screen and the window	State: statute protects enclosed spaces of a dwelling; a window screen can be part of the enclosure that a reasonable person would expect to protect against intrusion, so piercing that space is an ‘‘entry.’'	Holt: ‘‘entry’’ requires crossing the last barrier into the interior (threshold rule); statutory language does not define outer boundaries and must be construed narrowly in defendant’s favor.	The court held the statute encompasses intrusion past a window screen into the space behind it when a reasonable person would expect the screen to afford protection; rule of lenity does not apply because the court found a coherent statutory purpose supporting the result.
Whether the evidence was sufficient to prove Holt entered the space between screen and window	State: Stamper’s testimony that Holt had the screen halfway off and his fingers were in the area between screen and window supports entry beyond a reasonable doubt.	Holt: testimony was insufficient to show he actually penetrated the protected space.	The court held the evidence was sufficient: viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, Stamper’s testimony allowed a rational jury to find Holt intruded into the space between screen and window.

People v. Valencia, 46 P.3d 920 (Cal. 2002) (holds penetration behind a window screen can be an entry because the screen functions as part of the building’s outer boundary)
People v. Yarbrough, 281 P.3d 68 (Cal. 2012) (disapproves certain dictum in Valencia but recognizes that the nature of an enclosure governs whether intrusion is an entry)
Commonwealth v. Burke, 467 N.E.2d 846 (Mass. 1984) (treats outer window coverings as part of the dwelling; intrusion beyond them may constitute entry)
State v. Chappell, 193 S.E. 924 (S.C. 1937) (screen is an enclosing part of the dwelling where reaching through a torn screen to operate the window constituted entry)
State v. Pigques, 310 S.W.2d 942 (Mo. 1958) (rejects entry where defendant remained between outer and inner doors; treats crossing the last barrier as required)
Miller v. State, 187 So. 2d 51 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1966) (entry into an airspace between roof and ceiling was sufficient where defendant intruded into that intermediate space)