State v. Holsclaw
286 Or. App. 790
Or. Ct. App.2017Background
- Defendant, a designated predatory sex offender on parole, was convicted after a bench trial of seven counts of unlawfully being in locations where children regularly congregate under ORS 163.476 for using YMCA showers seven times while homeless.
- Parole conditions and parole supervisor had told defendant he could not enter the Tillamook County YMCA because minors congregate there; defendant nonetheless used the YMCA showers (six visits between 5:30–6:00 a.m., one at 7:09 a.m.).
- YMCA facility opened at 5:30 a.m.; daycare began at 7:00 a.m., preschool at 8:00 a.m., and children’s programming occurred throughout the day.
- Visitors (including paying nonmembers who used showers) check in at the front desk and, once past it, can access multiple areas of the building; the childcare room is along a hallway that also provides access to showers.
- Trial court found the YMCA to be a place where persons under 18 regularly congregate and convicted; defendant appealed arguing the shower area was not a covered “place” and that temporal limits (only when programs are scheduled) should apply.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the area defendant entered qualifies as a “premises where persons under 18 years of age regularly congregate” under ORS 163.476(2)(a) | The YMCA facility as a whole is such a place; statute targets types of places, not particular rooms or times | The specific shower area (and separate childcare room) are not the covered "place"; separate units in a multipurpose building should be treated separately | Court held the relevant premises can be the YMCA building as a whole; evidence supported that the YMCA is a covered place |
| Whether each "place" must be self-contained (separate physical access) | N/A (state argued building-level place) | Argued each separate unit (like childcare room) must be a distinct "place" (relying on Macon) | Court rejected importation of Macon here and found YMCA areas shared points of access, so not necessarily separate places |
| Whether the statute requires the place to be used contemporaneously (only during scheduled children’s programs) | Statute focuses on fixed types of places; no textual temporal limitation; a place remains covered even during inactive periods | Argued place qualifies only during times when children’s programs are scheduled | Court held no temporal limitation in text; a place does not cease being covered during routine inactivity; YMCA qualifies despite defendant visiting before program start times |
| Sufficiency of the evidence for conviction given statute construction | Given building-level construction and continuous scheduling, evidence was sufficient for convictions | Evidence insufficient because defendant was mostly present at times without scheduled children’s programs and used a separate shower area | Viewing evidence in state’s favor and construing statute as the court did, a rational factfinder could convict; convictions affirmed |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Hunt, 270 Or. App. 206 (review standard for statutory construction on sufficiency challenge)
- State v. Morgan, 361 Or. 47 (bench-trial sufficiency-challenge treated like judgment of acquittal)
- Chase & Chase, 354 Or. 776 (statutory-construction methodology)
- State v. Shockey, 285 Or. App. 718 (statutory-construction principles)
- State v. Macon, 249 Or. App. 260 (treating a self-contained unit as separate for burglary statute—distinguished)
- State v. McNally, 361 Or. 314 (use of dictionary definitions in statutory interpretation)
- State v. Gonzalez-Valenzuela, 358 Or. 451 (meaning of "place" in statutory context)
- Goodwin v. Kingsmen Plastering, 359 Or. 694 (using surrounding text to clarify statutory meaning)