250 P.3d 366
Or. Ct. App.2011Background
- Defendant Hollingquest was convicted of first-degree manslaughter and felon in possession of a firearm in 2002.
- The trial court imposed an upward departure sentence of 240 months for manslaughter based on judicial factfinding and a 36-month PPS; felon-in-possession sentence was shorter and concurrent.
- On direct appeal, convictions were challenged; the 36-month PPS was found erroneous and the case was remanded for resentencing under ORS 138.222(5).
- On remand, the court believed it could reimpose the upward departure based on prior findings, and deleted the PPS term in an amended judgment.
- Defendant argued Blakely v. Washington applies, requiring jury findings for any sentence enhancement on remand.
- The appellate court held that remand under ORS 138.222(5) requires resentencing and allows consideration of Blakely-based challenges; the court must determine constitutionality at resentencing.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether remand under ORS 138.222(5) allows Blakely-based challenges to be considered | Hollinquest argues remand does not require addressing Blakely issues. | Hollinquest contends Blakely challenges must be considered on remand. | Remand permits consideration of Blakely-based arguments. |
| Whether upward departure based on judicial factfinding was proper on remand | State contends departure based on judicial facts is permissible under remand standards. | Hollinquest argues Blakely prohibits such judicial factfinding for upward departure. | Upward departure based on judicial factfinding was improper after remand. |
| Whether ORS 136.792 requires a sentencing jury for enhancement facts on remand | State asserts discretion to decide on jury or not under remand statutes. | Hollinquest asserts a sentencing jury is required unless waiver/admission or prior jury findings exist. | A sentencing jury is required for enhancement facts on remand unless previously found by a jury or waived/admitted. |
| Whether the trial court had discretion to refuse to entertain defendant's constitutional challenges on remand | State argues the court may choose among lawful sentences. | Hollinquest argues the court should address Blakely-based challenges on remand. | The court had authority to consider constitutional arguments on remand; it may not refuse to address them if legally relevant. |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Edson, 329 Or. 127 (1999) (remand for restitution/resentencing when no ability to pay; clarifies ORS 138.222(5))
- State v. Sauceda, 236 Or. App. 358 (2010) (remand for resentencing after error; addresses review of sentencing issues on remand)
- State v. Cortes, 235 Or. App. 181 (2010) (remand for resentencing; discusses scope of on-remand issues)
- State v. Davis, 216 Or. App. 456 (2007) (Blakely-based challenges on remand; review of sentencing issues)
- State v. Smitherman, 200 Or. App. 383 (2005) (note on remand and sentencing issues;勿)
- State v. Wilkins, 175 Or. App. 569 (2001) (discussion of remand scope and sentence issues)
- State v. Hylton, 230 Or. App. 525 (2009) (OR 136.792 and jury determination on enhancement facts; remand context)
- State v. Martin, 221 Or. App. 78 (2008) (discretionary sentencing standards; interplay with ORS 138.222(5))
- State v. Rogers, 330 Or. 282 (2000) (limits on discretionary sentencing within constitutional constraints)
- State v. Dilts, 337 Or. 645 (2004) (Blakely precludes judicial factfinding for upward departures)
- Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004) (restrains judicial factfinding for sentence enhancements; jury findings required)
