State v. Holley, 485 P.3d 614

Background

Mark Holley III was convicted of first-degree felony murder (death of D'Shaun Smith), two counts of aggravated robbery (Timothy Albin), two counts of child endangerment, theft, and possession of marijuana arising from separate incidents in 2017.
In the Albin incident Holley entered Albin's small car, pointed a gun, demanded money/phone/wallet while Albin's 1- and 2-year-old children sat in the back; Holley was later convicted of child endangerment for this conduct.
In the Smith incident Holley shot and killed Smith in a car; Holley admitted shooting but claimed he acted in complete self-defense after Smith allegedly fired or attempted to fire at him.
Physical evidence: Smith’s Jimenez pistol was found jammed with a live cartridge stuck in the barrel; the fatal projectile matched a Smith & Wesson pistol found with Holley at arrest. Fingerprints and a phone linked Holley to the scene.
The district court denied Holley’s requested self-defense jury instruction, ruling he was barred by the forcible-felony statute; the jury convicted. Holley appealed raising (inter alia) the instruction refusal and sufficiency of child endangerment evidence.
The Kansas Supreme Court reversed the first-degree murder conviction (instructional error), affirmed child endangerment convictions, vacated the sentence, and remanded for further proceedings.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (State)	Defendant's Argument (Holley)	Held
Whether court erred in refusing a self-defense instruction under the forcible-felony rule	Forcible-felony statute precludes self-defense; error harmless	Barlett controls: self-defense barred only if defendant already committing a forcible felony when he commits separate violence	Court: Error — Barlett permits self-defense unless defendant was otherwise committing a forcible felony when the violence occurred; instruction legally appropriate
Whether self-defense was factually appropriate (subjective/objective belief in necessity of deadly force)	Evidence did not prove Holley reasonably believed deadly force necessary	Holley testified Smith fired/attempted to fire; physical evidence (jammed gun, external bullet strike) supports his account	Court: Factually appropriate; Holley’s testimony sufficed under subjective/objective test — a reasonable jury could find self-defense
Whether instructional error was harmless	State: error harmless; conviction should stand	Holley: refusal violated right to present defense; not harmless	Court: Not harmless — outcome depended on credibility between Holley and Reed; reversal of murder conviction required
Sufficiency of evidence for child endangerment (mental state and need to show likelihood of harm)	Evidence showed Holley knowingly pointed a gun in a small car with children present; likelihood of harm is one of several factors	Holley: State failed to prove he knew children were present and failed to show reasonable probability of harm	Court: Affirmed — a rational juror could find Holley knowingly endangered the children; probability of harm is not a required element but a factor to consider

Key Cases Cited

State v. Barlett, 308 Kan. 78 (adopting rule that self-defense is barred only if defendant was already otherwise committing a forcible felony when committing the separate act of violence)
State v. McLinn, 307 Kan. 307 (outlining three-step review for jury instruction issues)
State v. Qualls, 309 Kan. 553 (setting Kansas standard for justifiable deadly force — subjective and objective prongs)
State v. McCullough, 293 Kan. 970 (explaining the two-part self-defense test used in Kansas)
State v. Haygood, 308 Kan. 1387 (defendant's testimony can satisfy the evidence requirement for a self-defense instruction even if contradicted)
State v. Cummings, 297 Kan. 716 (child endangerment instruction should consider gravity of harm, statutory assessment of inherent peril, and likelihood of harm)
State v. Fisher, 230 Kan. 192 (earlier discussion of "may" in child endangerment statute as involving probability of harm)
State v. Keyes, 312 Kan. 103 (harmless-error standard applied to jury instruction claims)