State v. Hirschfelder
242 P.3d 876
Wash.2010Background
- Hirschfelder, a 33-year-old choir teacher, engaged in sexual intercourse with a high school choir member A.N.T. who was 18 and about to graduate.
- He was charged with sexual misconduct with a minor in the first degree under former RCW 9A.44.093(1)(b).
- Former RCW 9A.44.093(1)(b) criminalized sex between a school employee and a registered student aged at least 16 if the employee was 60 months older.
- The statute defined a “minor” in this subsection as a registered student of the school who is at least 16 years old, and the registered student could be up to age 21.
- The Court of Appeals reversed, holding the statute was ambiguous and likely limited to 16–17-year-old students; the State sought review.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether ‘minor’ in RCW 9A.44.093(1)(b) includes registered students aged 18–21. | Hirschfelder argues ‘minor’ excludes 18+ students. | State argues ‘minor’ includes all registered students 16–21. | Yes; ‘minor’ includes registered students 16–21. |
| Whether the statute is plain and unambiguous or ambiguous, triggering lenity. | Hirschfelder contends ambiguity; lenity should resolve in his favor. | State contends plain meaning controls. | Unambiguous; lenity not triggered. |
| Whether the statute is void for vagueness or violates equal protection. | Hirschfelder contends vagueness and discriminatory impact. | Statute provides sufficient notice and rational basis; no equal protection violation. | Not vague; rational basis supports classification; no equal protection violation. |
| Whether RCW 9A.44.030(3)(d) (defense based on victim’s age) applies to this case. | Dissent argues affirmative defense under 9A.44.030(3)(d) applies to 18-year-old victims. | Majority holds defense not determinative for interpretation here. | Affirmative defense exists but majority does not apply it to defeat the charge. |
| Whether non-K-12 educators interacting with students are unfairly singled out under the statute. | Argues conduct outside K-12 settings (e.g., Running Start) should be treated differently. | Statute rationally targets school employees due to access and supervisory role. | Rational basis; statute constitutional. |
Key Cases Cited
- Campbell v. Department of Ecology, 146 Wash.2d 1 (2002) (statutory interpretation principles; plain meaning governs)
- State v. J.P., 149 Wash.2d 444 (2003) (interpretation when applying statutory language and related provisions)
- Hallauer v. Spectrum Props., Inc., 143 Wash.2d 126 (2001) (sequence of related statutes; more specific vs. general rule applied later)
- State v. Clinkenbeard, 130 Wash.App. 552 (2005) (rational basis for classifying public school employees)
- State v. Gonzalez, 110 Wash.2d 738 (1988) (privacy rights and related constitutional considerations)
- State v. Smith, 93 Wash.2d 329 (1980) (rational basis review standards for equal protection)
- State v. Glas, 147 Wash.2d 410 (2002) (due process/vagueness standard for criminal statutes)
