State v. Hintze, 520 P.3d 1

In June 2016 Chad Hintze (a registered sex offender) was sitting on a public park bench with a 13‑year‑old girl when three uniformed bike officers approached, questioned them, learned Hintze's name, and discovered his sex‑offender status. Officers did not arrest him then and let him walk away.
The State filed a misdemeanor information charging “violation by sex offender of protected area” in March 2018 but took no further action for roughly two years; Hintze did not learn of the charge until March 2020 when it affected his parole eligibility on an unrelated 2017 conviction.
After learning of the charge, Hintze requested appointed counsel and a video appearance; counsel was appointed in June 2020, a preliminary hearing occurred in July 2020, and Hintze moved to suppress and to dismiss (speedy‑trial) in August 2020.
The district court denied both motions; Hintze entered a conditional guilty plea in September 2020 reserving appeal of those denials; the court sentenced by closing the case and imposing no additional jail time.
On appeal the majority considered only the Sixth Amendment speedy‑trial claim (reversing and ordering dismissal), while the dissent would have decided the Fourth Amendment suppression issue (finding an unlawful seizure without reasonable suspicion).

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (State)	Defendant's Argument (Hintze)	Held
Whether the two‑year post‑filing prosecutorial delay violated the Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial	Delay was negligent/neutral, no bad faith, Hintze did not timely assert a speedy‑trial demand, and he failed to prove actual prejudice from the delay	Delay (over two years after filing) triggered Barker; State to blame for delay; Hintze promptly sought counsel and invoked right after learning of the charge; delay caused prejudice (denial of parole/additional incarceration)	Majority: Four Barker factors weigh for Hintze; Sixth Amendment violated; conviction reversed and case dismissed.
Whether officers unlawfully seized Hintze before he gave his name and whether there was reasonable suspicion to detain	Encounter was a consensual level‑one contact; questioning and positioning were noncoercive (relying on Delgado/Drayton) and requesting a name was permissible	Three uniformed officers positioned themselves and their bikes to block egress and asked accusatory questions before requesting name—constituted a seizure without reasonable suspicion	Majority: did not reach suppression (decision unnecessary after speedy‑trial reversal). Dissent: would have found a seizure lacking reasonable suspicion and would reverse denial of suppression.

Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972) (establishing four‑factor speedy‑trial balancing test)
Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647 (1992) (discussing presumptive prejudice from excessive delay and double‑enquiry on length of delay)
Smith v. Hooey, 393 U.S. 374 (1969) (recognizing that delay may prejudice an incarcerated defendant by affecting parole or sentence concurrency)
Strunk v. United States, 412 U.S. 434 (1973) (remedy for a speedy‑trial violation is dismissal)
United States v. Loud Hawk, 474 U.S. 302 (1986) (weighting reasons for delay and prejudice in speedy‑trial analysis)
Vermont v. Brillon, 556 U.S. 81 (2009) (describing the Speedy Trial right as relative and contextual)
United States v. Koerber, 10 F.4th 1083 (10th Cir. 2021) (illustrative federal appellate treatment of Barker factors and defendant conduct)