State v. Hinesley, 490 P.3d 1141

In Sept. 2017 the State indicted Andrew Hinesley on multiple counts: Counts 1–3 (first-degree sexual assault), 4–6 (third-degree), Count 7 (continuous sexual assault of a minor under 14), and Counts 8–11 (first-/third-degree sexual assault alleged between Sept. 7–25, 2016).
Hinesley moved to dismiss Counts 1–6 with prejudice, arguing prosecutorial misconduct in charging both discrete acts and a continuous-offense covering the same period; he did not move to dismiss Counts 8–11.
At a May 9, 2018 hearing the parties admitted the grand jury transcript: the complaining witness testified both to "continued" sexual contact after turning 14 and to specific acts on Sept. 24 and again on Sept. 25, 2016.
The circuit court granted dismissal of Counts 1–6 and sua sponte dismissed Counts 8–11 with prejudice, reasoning the grand jury evidence did not support the broad Sept. 7–25 date range for Counts 8–11 and that charging flaws were "manifest and egregious," making reprosecution unfair.
On appeal, the State argued (inter alia) that the court misapplied HRS §707‑733.6(3) and that alleging a time range is permissible (citing State v. Arceo).
The Intermediate Court of Appeals affirmed dismissal of Counts 8–11 (finding the grand jury evidence supported only Sept. 24–25 events), but vacated the dismissal-with-prejudice as to Counts 8–11 and remanded for the trial court to enter detailed findings addressing whether prejudice was warranted.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the circuit court abused its discretion by sua sponte dismissing Counts 8–11	Dismissal was erroneous: the charged Sept. 7–25 range lies outside the continuous-offense period and time-range charges are permissible under Arceo	Grand jury evidence did not support the broad 18-day range; only discrete acts on Sept. 24–25 were supported, so dismissal was appropriate	No abuse of discretion: affirmed dismissal of Counts 8–11 because grand jury testimony did not supply probable cause for the full Sept. 7–25 range
Whether dismissal of Counts 8–11 should have been with prejudice	If dismissal was proper, it should be without prejudice; the court lacked sufficient grounds to bar reprosecution	Charging flaws were "manifest and egregious" and allowing reprosecution would be unfair and violate due process	Vacated dismissal-with-prejudice and remanded for written findings balancing state interest and defendant fairness under governing standards
Whether alleging a time range for sexual offenses is permissible (Arceo issue)	Range pleading is generally acceptable for minor-sexual-abuse cases per Arceo	Arceo is distinguishable: here grand jury testimony supplied specific dates, so the broad range was not supported	Arceo is distinguishable; time-range pleading permissible in general but not where grand jury evidence only supports specific dates

State v. Arceo, [citation="84 Hawai'i 1, 928 P.2d 843"] (Haw. 1996) (time-range pleading for child sexual-abuse charges is generally acceptable)
State v. Taylor, [citation="126 Hawai'i 205, 269 P.3d 740"] (Haw. 2011) (an indictment must be based on probable cause and grand jury must be presented evidence of each material element)
State v. Stan's Contracting, Inc., [citation="111 Hawai'i 17, 137 P.3d 331"] (Haw. 2006) (indictment must enable a grand jury to determine probable cause as to elements and culpable mental state)
State v. Wong, [citation="97 Hawai'i 512, 40 P.3d 914"] (Haw. 2002) (trial court's power to dismiss with prejudice is limited; dismissal with prejudice requires serious governmental misconduct or denial of due process)
State v. Mageo, [citation="78 Hawai'i 33, 889 P.2d 1092"] (App. 1995) (trial courts exercising sua sponte dismissal-with-prejudice should issue written factual findings explaining the reasons)
State v. Moriwake, 65 Haw. 47, 642 P.2d 705 (Haw. 1982) (factors and considerations a trial court should weigh before dismissing a criminal case with prejudice)