State v. Hiner, 7 P. 3477

Hiner was convicted of possession of cocaine and on probation for cocaine possession; the stop at issue occurred during police questioning of his sister and brother-in-law for a domestic dispute and suspected drunken driving in a casino parking lot.
Casino security called defendant outside; deputy ran a computer check showing Hiner had no valid license, was on cocaine probation, and had violent/weapon history; deputy suspected probation violation and alcohol consumption may be involved.
When Hiner arrived, deputy noted red/watery eyes, messy hair, odor of alcohol, and that the three had been drinking; Hiner denied drinking, then admitted to taking a couple sips, and denied having anything illegal.
Hiner refused consent to a search, then hesitantly allowed search after deputy and probation officer explained consequences; contraband discovered led to the challenged convictions.
Trial court found the deputy stopped Hiner when he stated Hiner was not free to leave and relied on a belief of probation violation; court found reasonable suspicion and that consent to search was voluntary.
On appeal, Hiner argued the stop was illegal for lacking authority to stop for a probation violation and that the consent was involuntary; the court affirmed, holding the deputy had authority to stop, the stop was justified by reasonable suspicion, and consent was voluntary.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Did the deputy have authority to stop for probation violation?	Hiner	Hiner	Yes; deputy had authority under ORS 137.545(2) to stop and investigate.
Was the stop supported by reasonable suspicion of probation violation?	Hiner	Hiner	Yes; facts supported reasonable suspicion despite being ultimately mistaken.
Was Hiner's consent to search voluntary?	Hiner	Hiner	Yes; probation officer informed consequences and defendant had opportunity to refuse; consent voluntary.
Did the probation terms actually ban alcohol consumption?	State	Hiner	No final incorrect belief about alcohol prohibition did not negate reasonable suspicion for the stop; terms were not strictly shown to ban alcohol.

State v. Hall, 339 Or. 7 (2005) (stop justification framework; three categories of street encounters)
State v. Warner, 284 Or. 147 (1978) (three categories of street encounters with justification levels)
State v. Steinke, 88 Or. App. 626 (1987) (authority to arrest implicitly authorizes stops for probation context)
State v. Ehly, 317 Or. 66 (1993) (reasonable suspicion standard and application)
State v. Ingman, 127 Or. App. 27 (1994) (objective reasonableness of officer belief despite later inaccuracies)
State v. Davis, 133 Or. App. 467 (1995) (probation search consent with a warning about consequences)
State v. Chilson, 219 Or. App. 136 (2008) (probationer belief may be objectively reasonable even if mistaken)
State v. Tiffin, 202 Or. App. 199 (2005) (reasonableness of suspicion and investigative stop in probation context)