State v. Hilliard, 2017 Ohio 2952

Defendant Garrison Hilliard lived in the main house on a shared property with his mother and his niece’s children; victim Andrew Davis lived in a second house but had a key and visited the main house.
An altercation occurred in the main house; Hilliard retrieved a modified flare gun loaded with a .410 shell and shot Davis in the face.
Hilliard admitted the shooting but claimed self-defense and invoked the Castle Doctrine.
A jury convicted Hilliard of two counts of felonious assault (one under R.C. 2903.11(A)(2) with firearm specifications and one under R.C. 2903.11(A)(1)) and unlawful possession of dangerous ordnance; he was sentenced to an aggregate five-year term.
On appeal Hilliard challenged (1) that the convictions were against the manifest weight of the evidence because he acted in self-defense, (2) the adequacy of jury instructions (including Castle Doctrine instructions), and (3) ineffective assistance of counsel for not pursuing/insisting on different instructions.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether convictions were against the manifest weight because Hilliard acted in self-defense	State: Evidence supports verdict; Davis was privileged to be in the home and jury could reject self-defense	Hilliard: He was not at fault, reasonably believed he faced imminent harm, and the Castle Doctrine applied	Court: Affirmed—jury could credit Davis, Hilliard fetched and loaded weapon, and Castle Doctrine did not apply because Davis had right to be there; no manifest miscarriage of justice
Whether jury instructions were incomplete/ambiguous regarding dwelling/residence and Castle Doctrine rebuttal burden	State: Instructions accurately stated law; definitions unnecessary; omissions harmless	Hilliard: Court failed to define "dwelling"/"residence" and failed to instruct on rebuttal burden/related clarifications	Court: No reversible error—instructions largely tracked Ohio Jury Instructions and statutory language; any omission was harmless and not prejudicial under plain-error review
Whether trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective for not insisting on additional instructions or objections	State: Counsel’s performance was reasonable; instructions were correct; counsel actively litigated instructions	Hilliard: Counsel was deficient for not securing definitions/clarity on burdens and burden-shifting	Court: No ineffective assistance—counsel’s performance was not deficient and no prejudice shown under Strickland

State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380 (Ohio 1997) (standard for manifest-weight review)
State v. Poole, 33 Ohio St.2d 18 (Ohio 1973) (self-defense is an affirmative defense excusing otherwise criminal conduct)
State v. Robbins, 58 Ohio St.2d 74 (Ohio 1979) (elements and burden for self-defense)
State v. DeHass, 10 Ohio St.2d 230 (Ohio 1967) (credibility and weight of evidence are for the trier of fact)
State v. Thompson, 33 Ohio St.3d 1 (Ohio 1987) (standard for evaluating jury instructions)
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (U.S. 1984) (two-prong test for ineffective assistance of counsel)
State v. Bradley, 42 Ohio St.3d 136 (Ohio 1989) (application of Strickland in Ohio)
State v. Barnes, 94 Ohio St.3d 21 (Ohio 2002) (plain-error standard for Crim.R. 52(B) review)
State v. Rogers, 143 Ohio St.3d 385 (Ohio 2015) (forfeiture of jury-instruction objections; plain-error framework)