497 S.W.3d 391
Mo. Ct. App.2016Background
- In December 2013 Frederick Hill III and Mary Vinson lived together in a mobile home that they jointly occupied; Hill paid the lot rent.
- Vinson obtained an ex parte order of protection on December 5, 2013 listing the mobile home as her residence and enjoining Hill from entering or remaining on the premises.
- A deputy served the Order on Hill at the mobile home, read it aloud, and told Hill he had to leave; Hill refused and said he would not leave except by force.
- Officers prepared to forcibly remove Hill; 20–60 minutes later Hill exited voluntarily and was arrested for violating the Order by remaining in the residence after being served.
- Hill was tried for first-degree trespass (class B misdemeanor), convicted by a jury, and sentenced to ten days in jail; he appeals arguing insufficiency of the evidence because an owner cannot trespass on his own property.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether an owner can be charged with first-degree trespass for remaining on his own property after being served with an order of protection | The State: statute penalizes knowingly remaining unlawfully; owner status does not immunize one from being "unlawful" when bound by an order of protection | Hill: as owner he was privileged/licensed to remain on his property, so he cannot be guilty of trespass on his own property | Affirmed: owner can be charged where an order of protection lawfully enjoins presence and the defendant knowingly remains unlawfully |
| Whether the evidence was sufficient to support conviction | The State: officers served the Order, Hill remained after being told to leave, then was arrested — conduct satisfies knowingly remaining unlawfully | Hill: insufficient evidence—cannot trespass on own property; his ownership granted privilege to remain | Affirmed: service of the Order and refusal to leave supported the trespass conviction |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Richie, 376 S.W.3d 58 (Mo. App. 2012) (defines unlawful entry/remain in context of trespass)
- State v. Taylor, 298 S.W.3d 482 (Mo. banc 2009) (standard for appellate review of sufficiency issues)
- Bateman v. Rinehart, 391 S.W.3d 441 (Mo. banc 2013) (apply plain meaning when statutory language is clear)
- Green v. Missouri, 734 F. Supp. 2d 814 (E.D. Mo. 2010) (refusal to leave after authorized request can support trespass charge)
- Rundell v. Director of Revenue, 487 S.W.3d 496 (Mo. App. 2016) (statutory interpretation gives effect to plain legislative intent)