State v. Hill, 2020 Ohio 7

Michael Hill was indicted on eight drug-related counts; he pleaded guilty to two counts (possession of cocaine, third-degree; aggravated possession of drugs, fifth-degree) and agreed to forfeiture; remaining counts were dismissed.
Hill was on post-release control (PRC) when he entered the guilty pleas.
At the plea hearing the court advised Hill that his PRC could be terminated and that, if terminated, the court could impose an additional prison term equal to the greater of one year or the remaining PRC time, to be served consecutively; Hill acknowledged understanding.
The State’s factual recitation at the plea hearing omitted the word “knowingly” (it said Hill “possessed” the drugs rather than “knowingly possessed”), while the indictment tracked the statutory language.
The trial court sentenced Hill to consecutive terms (3 years and 1 year) and ordered Hill to serve the remaining PRC period (547 days) consecutively; Hill appealed, arguing (1) inadequate Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a) PRC/maximum-penalty advisement and (2) an incomplete factual recitation affecting the voluntariness of his pleas.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the trial court failed to comply with Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a) by not expressly stating that the trial court (rather than the parole board) could terminate PRC and impose a consecutive PRC prison term	State: Court’s advisement accurately described the PRC consequences under R.C. 2929.141(A)(1) (termination, additional term equal to greater of 1 year or remaining PRC, consecutive) and was sufficient	Hill: Court failed to inform him that it (the trial court) could terminate PRC and impose the additional consecutive sentence, so plea was not knowing and voluntary	Court: Advisement was complete and accurate; Hill’s first assignment of error overruled (Crim.R.11 compliance satisfied)
Whether the State’s factual recitation omitted an essential element ("knowingly") so that Hill’s pleas were not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary	State: Slight variation from indictment does not presume misunderstanding where indictment correctly notified defendant, he had counsel, and nothing in record suggests lack of understanding	Hill: Omission of the element "knowingly" rendered the factual basis insufficient and the plea uninformed (relies on Davis)	Court: Distinguished Davis; record shows Hill subjectively understood the charges; slight variation did not defeat substantial compliance with Crim.R.11; second assignment of error overruled

Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (establishes guilty plea must be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary)
State v. Clark, 893 N.E.2d 462 (Ohio 2008) (explains substantial-compliance standard for nonconstitutional Crim.R.11 advisements)
State v. Bishop, 124 N.E.3d 766 (Ohio 2018) (requires Crim.R.11(C)(2)(a) advisement to include PRC consequences under R.C. 2929.141(A)(1))
State v. Nero, 564 N.E.2d 474 (Ohio 1990) (substantial compliance measured by defendant’s subjective understanding)
State v. Sarkozy, 881 N.E.2d 1224 (Ohio 2008) (explains prejudice inquiry when Crim.R.11 compliance is only partial)
State v. Greathouse, 814 N.E.2d 502 (Ohio App. 2004) (minor differences between indictment and prosecutor’s factual recital do not presume misunderstanding)
State v. Riddle, 88 N.E.3d 475 (Ohio 2017) (State not required to recite factual basis at plea hearing)