State v. Herron, 356 P.3d 709

Defendant Jerry Allen Herron charged with first-degree rape while armed; trial court planned individual juror questioning (voir dire) in chambers for sensitive sexual-assault issues.
At an initial readiness hearing court explained in-chambers juror questioning could conflict with the public-trial right; defense and Herron signaled no objection and willingness to waive on the record.
At a subsequent pretrial colloquy the court twice informed Herron of his right to a public trial, explained alternatives (public individual questioning away from other jurors), and confirmed Herron’s preference to conduct sensitive juror questioning in chambers.
The court found Herron knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived his public-trial right; no written waiver was executed but extensive on-the-record colloquies exist.
Voir dire proceeded with selected jurors questioned in chambers; four jurors were excused for cause. Herron was convicted; Court of Appeals affirmed and Washington Supreme Court granted review.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Herron)	Defendant's Argument (State)	Held
Did Herron waive his right to a public trial?	Herron contends any waiver was invalid or insufficient to forfeit appellate challenge.	State argues Herron knowingly and repeatedly waived the public-trial right via on-the-record colloquies.	Court: Waiver was knowing, voluntary, intelligent based on repeated, affirmative on-the-record statements.
May Herron assert the public’s (general) right to open administration of justice after waiving his own public-trial right?	Herron seeks to press article I, §10 public-access interests despite his waiver.	State contends Herron lacks third-party standing to assert public’s interest because he benefited from closure and lacks close relation to the public.	Court: Herron lacks standing to assert the public’s right; he cannot now assert third-party interests he waived.

State v. Momah, 167 Wn.2d 140 (2009) (public-trial right extends to in-chambers juror questioning)
State v. Bone-Club, 128 Wn.2d 254 (1995) (five-factor analysis required before courtroom closure)
State v. Frawley, 181 Wn.2d 452 (2014) (waiver may be an affirmative, unequivocal personal expression; written waiver or equivalent colloquy suffice)
Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400 (1991) (three-part test for third-party standing)
State v. Wise, 176 Wn.2d 1 (2012) (mere silence does not constitute waiver of public-trial right)
State v. Stegall, 124 Wn.2d 719 (1994) (validity of waiver depends on case circumstances)
Seattle Times Co. v. Ishikawa, 97 Wn.2d 30 (1982) (court must inform potential objectors of the nature of asserted interests for an opportunity to object to have practical meaning)