State v. Hernandez, 959 N.W.2d 769

Information charging Hernandez with possession of methamphetamine filed Jan. 15, 2020; he was released pending trial on condition of participating in a 24/7 Sobriety Program.
Hernandez was incarcerated in Iowa Feb. 21–Apr. 3, 2020, and again beginning June 3, 2020; he expected to complete his Iowa sentence in Jan. 2021.
A bench warrant was issued by the Nebraska court on Apr. 16, 2020, for failure to participate in the 24/7 program; the warrant was never served and the State made no record of attempts to serve it.
No trial or other Nebraska proceedings occurred within six months of the information; Hernandez moved for absolute discharge under the statutory speedy trial provisions on Aug. 4, 2020.
At the discharge hearing the State presented no testimony or documents and relied on facts Hernandez alleged in his motion as judicial admissions; the district court found 114 days excludable and denied discharge.
The Nebraska Supreme Court reversed, holding the State failed to prove excludable time under § 29-1207(4)(d) (absence/unavailability) or (4)(a) (other proceedings) and directed dismissal.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (State)	Defendant's Argument (Hernandez)	Held
Whether the State met its burden to prove excluded time when it offered no evidence but relied on Hernandez’s pleadings	The State may rely on Hernandez’s judicial admissions in his motion to satisfy its burden	The State failed to produce evidence and therefore did not prove any statutory exclusion	Judicial admissions can substitute for evidence, but here the admissions did not establish any excludable period, so the State failed its burden
Whether issuance of a bench warrant alone stops the speedy-trial clock under § 29-1207(4)(d) (absence/unavailability)	The issuance of the bench warrant effectively stopped the clock	Warrant issuance without service or proof of notice/diligent efforts to secure defendant’s presence does not create an excludable absence	A warrant alone does not automatically exclude time; the State must show notice or diligent efforts to serve the warrant—none shown here
Whether Hernandez’s custody in Iowa qualified as "other proceedings concerning the defendant" under § 29-1207(4)(a)	Time incarcerated in another jurisdiction should be treated as excludable "other proceedings"	Mere incarceration is insufficient; there must be a proceeding (an application to a court) causing delay	"Proceeding" is narrower: requires an application to a court; here there was no evidence of pending proceedings in Iowa causing delay, so time is not excludable

State v. Chapman, 307 Neb. 443, 949 N.W.2d 490 (clarifies that a warrant does not automatically toll the speedy-trial clock; notice/diligent efforts required)
State v. Blocher, 307 Neb. 874, 951 N.W.2d 499 (holds § 29-1207(4)(a) can cover proceedings in other jurisdictions but does not define "proceeding" unboundedly)
State v. Jennings, 308 Neb. 835, 957 N.W.2d 143 (explains the statutory six-month calculation and State's burden of proof for exclusions)
State v. Richter, 240 Neb. 223, 481 N.W.2d 200 (recognizes that failure to appear can start an exclusion only after proper notice of required appearance)
State v. Tamayo, 280 Neb. 836, 791 N.W.2d 152 (provides a focused definition of "proceeding" for speedy-trial exclusions)
State v. Canady, 263 Neb. 552, 641 N.W.2d 43 (discusses the nature and effect of judicial admissions)