State v. Hernandez
309 Neb. 299
| Neb. | 2021Background
- State charged Jaime A. Hernandez Jr. by information with possession of methamphetamine on January 15, 2020; Hernandez pled not guilty and was released under a 24/7 Sobriety Program condition.
- A written arraignment was filed the same day but did not specify any court appearance date.
- Bench warrant issued April 16, 2020 for nonparticipation in the 24/7 program; the record shows no attempt to serve the warrant.
- Hernandez was incarcerated in Iowa Feb 21–Apr 3, 2020, and again from June 3, 2020 onward; no Iowa proceedings were pled as pending in Nebraska beyond an expected sentence completion in Jan 2021.
- Hernandez moved for absolute discharge on speedy-trial grounds Aug 4, 2020; the State presented no evidence at the hearing and relied on Hernandez’s written factual allegations (judicial admissions).
- The district court found 114 days excludable and denied discharge; the Nebraska Supreme Court reversed, holding the State failed to prove any excludable time under § 29-1207(4).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Did the State meet its burden to prove excludable time under § 29-1207(4)? | State relied on Hernandez’s judicial admissions in his motion to satisfy its burden without presenting additional evidence. | Hernandez argued the State produced no evidence and admissions did not establish statutory exclusions. | The court: judicial admissions can substitute for evidence, but here the admissions did not prove any excludable time; the State failed its burden. |
| Does issuance of a bench warrant alone stop the speedy‑trial clock under § 29-1207(4)(d) (absence/unavailability)? | State asserted the bench warrant stopped the clock. | Hernandez argued issuance without notice/effort to serve does not create excludable absence. | The court: mere issuance does not stop the clock; exclusion requires notice or proof of diligent efforts to serve the warrant. |
| Can a defendant’s statements in pleadings and at hearing be used as judicial admissions to prove exclusions? | State argued Hernandez’s motion statements are judicial admissions and may be relied on as proof. | Hernandez contended his allegations could not supply the State’s required proof of exclusions. | The court: judicial admissions are admissible, but they must be deliberate, clear, and actually establish the exclusion; here they did not. |
| Does incarceration in another jurisdiction qualify as "other proceedings concerning the defendant" under § 29-1207(4)(a)? | State urged that time incarcerated in Iowa qualifies as "other proceedings" and is excludable. | Hernandez argued incarceration alone, without pending proceedings or detainer, does not satisfy § 29-1207(4)(a). | The court: "proceeding" requires an application to a court (pending proceedings); mere incarceration to finish a sentence does not establish the required proceeding, so time was not excludable. |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Chapman, 307 Neb. 443, 949 N.W.2d 490 (clarifies that issuance of a warrant does not automatically exclude time; notice or diligent service efforts are required)
- State v. Blocher, 307 Neb. 874, 951 N.W.2d 499 (§ 29-1207(4)(a) can exclude time spent in other proceedings when they are actual proceedings)
- State v. Jennings, 308 Neb. 835, 957 N.W.2d 143 (explains calculation of speedy‑trial time and State’s burden to prove exclusions)
- State v. Richter, 240 Neb. 223, 481 N.W.2d 200 (requires notice to defendant before absence can begin exclusion)
- State v. Tamayo, 280 Neb. 836, 791 N.W.2d 152 (definition of "proceeding" for speedy‑trial exclusion purposes)