455 P.3d 503
Or.2019Background
- Defendant (ex-partner) unlawfully entered the victim’s dwelling, damaged property (TV, lamps) and bled on furniture; he sent the victim texts showing his injury, which led to his arrest.
- Charged with first-degree burglary (dwelling) and second-degree criminal mischief; after the state rested defendant moved for judgment of acquittal on burglary for lack of intent at time of entry.
- Trial court denied the motion; jury convicted on both counts. Court of Appeals reversed the burglary conviction, holding the state must prove intent to commit an additional crime at the moment of unlawful entry.
- The Oregon Supreme Court granted review to decide whether the requisite intent may be formed at any time while unlawfully present, rather than only at the start of the trespass.
- The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court: intent to commit a crime may be formed at any time during unlawful presence (remaining), and the trial court correctly denied the judgment of acquittal; failure to give a jury concurrence instruction was not plain error.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether burglary requires intent to commit an additional crime at the initiation of the trespass, or whether forming that intent later while unlawfully present suffices | State: statute (ORS 164.215/164.225) requires only that unlawful entry or remaining be accompanied at some point by intent; intent may develop during unlawful presence | Henderson: intent must exist at the start of the trespass (at entry or at the moment a lawful presence became unlawful); later-formed intent during an unlawful entry is insufficient | Intent need only exist at some point during the unlawful presence (may be formed after entry); burglary conviction affirmed |
| Whether the trial court committed plain error by failing sua sponte to give a jury concurrence instruction on the criminal mischief count | N/A (state argued single act theory of mischief) | Henderson: absent a concurrence instruction, jurors may have convicted based on different factual instances of mischief | No plain error; trial court not required to give the instruction sua sponte |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Pipkin, 354 Or 513 (2013) ("entering" and "remaining unlawfully" are alternative/complimentary ways to prove unlawful presence)
- State v. Luckey, 150 Or 566 (1935) (older formulation requiring intent at time of breaking and entering)
- Quarles v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 1872 (2019) (remaining-in burglary: intent may be formed at any time while unlawfully remaining)
- State v. Gornick, 340 Or 160 (2006) (plain-error review standard)
