State v. Hemenway, 295 P.3d 617

Background

Defendant charged with possession of methamphetamine; motion to suppress denied; Court of Appeals reversed and remanded on exploitation theory; this Court consolidates petitions after Ashbaugh decision; majority revises the exploitation framework; stop occurred near midnight during welfare-check; defendant, moving out possessions, had rifle, handgun and other drugs found during consensual searches; three searches followed defendant’s stop and consent; defense argued consent derived from unlawful stop; trial court and appellate rulings centered on whether consent was tainted by exploitation of the stop.
The stop was unlawful under Article I, section 9, but the state did not challenge that conclusion on review; analysis focused on whether voluntary consents to search were tainted by the prior illegality; the Court of Appeals found exploitation under Hall and requested suppression; the majority disavows the “minimal factual nexus” portion of Hall and redefines the test for exploitation.
The majority articulates a two-prong framework: (1) whether the consent was voluntary, and (2) whether the consent was obtained through exploitation of the prior illegal stop; the state may prove absence of exploitation by showing the taint was remote or by independent lawful sources; defendant’s first consent to search was voluntary and not the product of exploitation; evidence from the tin and subsequent searches was not tainted; the arrest following the searches was supported by Miranda warnings and probable cause.
The Court reverses the Court of Appeals and affirms the circuit court judgment; suppression is not required where the state proves voluntariness and lack of exploitation; Hall’s minimal nexus concept is disavowed as a stand-alone trigger for suppression.
The decision clarifies that Article I, section 9 rights require analysis of voluntariness and exploitation on a case-by-case, fact-intensive basis, not a rigid prior-formula rule.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the prior unlawful stop tainted the consent searches.	Hemenway—exploitation requires suppression.	Hall overruled; consent could be attenuated.	Consent not tainted; no suppression required.
How exploitation should be assessed after Ashbaugh and Hall.	State—Hall framework should be retained.	Court should move to a voluntariness-plus-exploitation test.	Disavows Hall’s minimal-nexus; adopts two-prong voluntariness-and-exploitation test.
Whether the first consent to search was voluntary independent of the stop.	Consents arose from welfare-check context.	Consent tainted by illegality.	First consent voluntary and not derived from exploitation.
Whether evidence from the tin and subsequent searches was tainted by exploitation.	Exploitation linked to stop.	Evidence remains admissible if attenuated.	Tin evidence not tainted; subsequent searches lawful.
Whether the arrest and residence search were lawful after Miranda warnings.	Consent after arrest admissible.	Exploitation taint may extend to later searches.	Arrest and subsequent consent-supported searches lawful; no suppression.

Key Cases Cited

State v. Hall, 339 Or 7 (2005) (exploitation framework for consent searches following illegal stops)
State v. Rodgers/Kirkeby, 347 Or 610 (2010) (exploitations after unlawful detention; suppression when taint present)
State v. Kennedy, 290 Or 493 (1981) (voluntariness of consent; absence of coercive factors)
State v. Rodriguez, 317 Or 27 (1993) (consent may be voluntary even if prompted; explores exploitation)
Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963) (exploitation doctrine in federal context)
United States v. Johnson, 335 Or 511 (2003) (rejected minimal nexus approach; burden-shifting on exploitation)
Wolfe, 295 Or 567 (1983) (voluntariness and coercion considerations in consent)