State v. Helberth Perez, 161 A.3d 487

Background

Defendant Helberth Perez, father of the complainant (Maya), was tried and convicted on six counts of first-degree sexual assault and three counts of second-degree sexual assault for repeated sexual abuse of Maya beginning when she was about 14.
Maya testified to multiple incidents of forced oral sex, digital penetration, and coercion (threats to jail/deportation); no physical evidence or third‑party eyewitnesses corroborated the acts.
Maya’s sister Hillary testified about separate, earlier uncharged sexual contact by defendant when Hillary was about 12; the trial court admitted that testimony under Rule 404(b) for limited purposes after a voir dire and gave limiting instructions.
Defendant moved for judgment of acquittal at the close of the state’s case (denied) but did not renew the motion at the close of all evidence; he was sentenced to an effective 50‑year term (28 years to serve).
On appeal, defendant challenged (1) admission of Hillary’s testimony under Rule 404(b), (2) adequacy of limiting instructions, and (3) denial of a judgment of acquittal as to count 5 (allegedly duplicative of count 4).

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (State)	Defendant's Argument (Perez)	Held
Admissibility under Rule 404(b) of Hillary’s testimony	Testimony is nonremote and similar (age, family relationship, location, access) and relevant to motive/plan/intent; reasonably necessary to meet low relevancy threshold	Testimony was too remote and dissimilar ("accidental" touching vs. calculated assaults on Maya); prejudicial propensity evidence	Affirmed: trial justice did not abuse discretion; testimony admissible for limited purposes and was reasonably necessary given credibility contest
Similarity and relevance of uncharged acts	Uncharged acts show defendant’s pattern of lecherous conduct toward daughters under his control; relevant under low relevancy standard	Acts were dissimilar in method and context and thus not probative of a common scheme or plan	Affirmed: differences outweighed by similarities in age, relationship, location, and probative value for credibility and intent
Adequacy of limiting instruction on use of 404(b) evidence	Trial court gave limiting instruction identifying permissible purposes (motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, absence of mistake); repeated at close	Instruction was too general and failed to specify the particular exception; defendant did not preserve objection	Affirmed/waived: defendant did not object at trial; issue waived under raise‑or‑waive rule; instruction was given contemporaneously and at close
Denial of judgment of acquittal on count 5 (shower incident alleged twice)	Counts 4 and 5 describe distinct acts on verdict form (hand-to-vagina and coerced self-touching); state suggested issue could be raised postconviction	Counts 4 and 5 arose from the same shower incident and thus conviction on both is duplicative; trial evidence supports only one second-degree assault conviction for that incident	Remedy: vacated count 5 for judicial economy and because only one conviction was supported; remainder of convictions affirmed

Key Cases Cited

State v. Mohapatra, 880 A.2d 802 (R.I. 2005) (prior sexual misconduct admissible only if nonremote, similar, relevant, and reasonably necessary)
State v. Hopkins, 698 A.2d 183 (R.I. 1997) (uncharged sexual acts admissible to show common scheme or modus operandi despite temporal remoteness where other indicia support probative value)
State v. Merida, 960 A.2d 228 (R.I. 2008) (uncharged misconduct must be nonremote and similar; trial justice must provide limiting instruction)
State v. Jalette, 382 A.2d 526 (R.I. 1978) (Rule 404(b) evidence admissible only when relevant to charge and reasonably necessary)
State v. Pignolet, 465 A.2d 176 (R.I. 1983) (uncharged incidents probative of defendant’s lecherous conduct toward girls under his control)