State v. Heinonen, 909 N.W.2d 584

Officers executed a search warrant at Heinonen's home and found a short-barreled shotgun in a closet; mail in a shoebox linked the residence to Heinonen. Heinonen is a convicted felon who cannot possess firearms.
Investigator Sturm Mirandized Heinonen; Heinonen invoked his right to remain silent and declined to speak; he was not asked for counsel. Sturm stopped questioning and Heinonen was later arrested and taken to jail.
About two hours later Sturm and Sgt. McLean asked Heinonen in jail to sign a written consent form to provide a DNA sample; the form mentioned the right to refuse consent but did not reissue Miranda warnings.
Heinonen signed the consent; McLean took two buccal swabs. While swabbing, Heinonen asked why; McLean said to compare his DNA to DNA recovered from the shotgun, and Heinonen then said he had handled the gun.
A forensic match linked Heinonen’s DNA to a major male profile from the shotgun. Heinonen moved to suppress the DNA and his admission as the product of a second custodial interrogation; the trial court denied suppression and he was convicted; the court of appeals affirmed.

Issue	Heinonen's Argument	State's Argument	Held
Whether asking for written consent to take DNA after Heinonen invoked Miranda was a custodial interrogation	The request was a second interrogation reasonably likely to elicit incriminating responses and thus required Miranda warnings	Asking for consent is non‑testimonial and not reasonably likely to elicit incriminating testimony; no Miranda required	Asking for consent was not an interrogation under Innis; no Miranda required
Whether explaining purpose of DNA request was an interrogation	Explaining the purpose (to compare to shotgun DNA) was likely to elicit incriminating statements	A factual, non‑accusatory explanation is not reasonably likely to elicit incriminating testimony	Officer’s factual explanation was not reasonably likely to elicit incriminating testimony; not interrogation
Whether signing consent is a testimonial act triggering Fifth Amendment	Signing consent is communicative and thus protected by Fifth Amendment after invocation	Consent is not testimonial because it does not communicate facts or disclose knowledge	Signing consent is not an incriminating testimonial communication; Fifth Amendment not triggered
Whether providing a DNA sample is a testimonial act	Providing DNA plus consent produces incriminating evidence and thus implicates the privilege	Providing physical evidence is non‑testimonial; Schmerber controls	Providing a physical DNA sample is non‑testimonial; Fifth Amendment does not bar collection

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (Miranda warnings required before custodial interrogation)
Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (interrogation covers words/actions reasonably likely to elicit incriminating response)
Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (privilege applies only to compelled testimonial communications)
Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201 (testimonial communication must disclose facts/knowledge)
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (compelling physical evidence is not testimonial)
Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96 (police must scrupulously honor invocation of right to remain silent)
State v. Zornes, 831 N.W.2d 609 (Minn. 2013) (context where DNA‑sampling discussion produced incriminating statements)
State v. Greenleaf, 591 N.W.2d 488 (Minn. 1999) (non‑accusatory requests—e.g., waiving extradition—unlikely to elicit incriminating responses)