State v. Heidelberg, 2019 Ohio 2257

On June 12, 2016, Heidelberg led police on a high‑speed chase on his motorcycle and crashed into a patrol car; officers smelled alcohol. He was indicted on multiple counts, including failure to comply with a police signal (third‑degree felony) and multiple OVI counts (misdemeanors).
On May 22, 2017, Heidelberg pleaded guilty to attempted failure to comply (reduced to a fifth‑degree felony via the attempt statute) and one OVI count; other counts were dismissed and the state remained silent at sentencing.
On July 18, 2017, the trial court sentenced him to concurrent terms, imposed a lifetime driver’s license suspension on the attempted failure‑to‑comply conviction (Count 1), and a three‑year suspension on the OVI conviction (Count 2).
Heidelberg appealed, arguing (1) the lifetime suspension for Count 1 was contrary to law, and (2) the trial court abused its discretion by imposing maximum license suspensions.
The Sixth District vacated the lifetime suspension on Count 1 (holding attempted failure to comply is not governed by the specific R.C. 2921.331 sentencing provisions) and affirmed the three‑year suspension on the OVI count as within statutory authority.

Issue	Heidelberg's Argument	State's Argument	Held
Whether a lifetime (class‑two) driver’s license suspension under R.C. 2921.331(E) could be imposed for a conviction of attempted failure to comply	The trial court lacked authority to impose the R.C. 2921.331(E) suspension because the offense was a reduced attempt and thus governed by the general sentencing statute (R.C. 2929.14) which contains no license‑suspension provision	The court could apply the specific R.C. 2921.331 sentencing provision to the attempted conviction (relying on prior authority treating attempts in conjunction with the underlying statute)	Held: Attempted failure to comply is not incorporated into R.C. 2921.331; sentencing is governed by general felony statute R.C. 2929.14. The lifetime suspension was contrary to law and vacated.
Whether the trial court abused its discretion by imposing a three‑year license suspension for the OVI conviction (Count 2)	Heidelberg contends the court treated him as a first‑time offender and mistakenly thought three years was mandatory; thus imposing the maximum was an abuse of discretion	The state argues the plea and plea form established (G)(1)(b) recidivist exposure, allowing a 1–7 year suspension; three years is within the permissible range	Held: The judgment and plea material show (G)(1)(b) applied. A three‑year suspension was authorized and not an abuse of discretion.

State v. Kalish, 896 N.E.2d 124 (Ohio 2008) (framework for reviewing whether a sentence is contrary to law when trial court followed statutory sentencing procedures)
State v. Taylor, 865 N.E.2d 37 (Ohio 2007) (holding attempted drug offenses may be subject to the substantive statute’s sentencing provisions where attempt is incorporated into that statute)