190 A.3d 232
Me.2018Background
- Heffron had an existing protection-from-abuse order (issued after a full hearing) that prohibited him from having any direct or indirect contact with the protected person; he had actual notice of the order.
- In Sept. 2017 Heffron posted multiple messages on his publicly accessible Facebook page that directly addressed the protected person (opening with “Hey [name]” and using second-person “you”) and included personal, derogatory, and threatening language.
- The protected person learned of the posts when a relative of Heffron forwarded screenshots to the protected person; police also located the posts on Heffron’s public Facebook page.
- Heffron was charged in the Unified Criminal Docket with violating the protection order (Class D, 19-A M.R.S. § 4011(1)), proceeded to a jury-waived trial, and was convicted.
- The trial court found Heffron intentionally authored the posts, intended them to reach the protected person, and used Facebook as an intervening instrumentality to communicate.
- The court sentenced Heffron to 90 days (all but 21 days suspended) and one year’s probation with social-media restrictions; Heffron appealed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (Heffron) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Facebook posts constituted "direct or indirect contact" under the no-contact order | Posts were direct communications addressing the protected person and reached them via Facebook; thus they are prohibited contact | Posts were not "contact" within the meaning of the order | Held: Yes — posts were indirect contact through an intervening agency and intended to reach the protected person |
| Whether Heffron had adequate notice that such posts were prohibited conduct | Heffron had actual notice of the broad no-contact prohibition and his intentional posts foreseeably reached the protected person | Heffron lacked sufficient notice that posting on social media would violate the order | Held: No — given intent and foreseeability, Heffron cannot claim lack of notice |
| Whether the posts are protected speech under the First Amendment | Protection order validly restrains contact; these harassing/threatening communications fall outside First Amendment protection | Posts are expressive speech protected by the First Amendment | Held: No — the communications were harassing/threatening and the injunction was a valid content-neutral restraint tied to safety findings |
| Mens rea required for violation (intent/knowledge) | State: court found Heffron acted intentionally, satisfying the requisite culpability | Heffron challenged sufficiency on authorship/mens rea grounds | Held: Court found intentional action; that finding suffices to establish the requisite culpability, so issue resolved against Heffron |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Elliott, 987 A.2d 513 (Me. 2010) (defines contact to include communicating through an intervening agency or instrumentality)
- State v. Smen, 895 A.2d 319 (Me. 2006) (violation requires prior actual notice of the protective order)
- State v. Pettengill, 635 A.2d 1309 (Me. 1994) (ordinary meaning of "contact" in protective/bail orders)
- Childs v. Ballou, 148 A.3d 291 (Me. 2016) (protection orders may lawfully restrict contact where prior abusive conduct would cause fear of bodily injury and emotional distress)
- State v. Proia, 168 A.3d 798 (Me. 2017) (standard for reviewing trial findings of fact)