State v. Hector Martinez, 03-14-00588-CR

Background

Around 12:25 a.m. on March 15, 2013, APD Officer Marcos Johnson detained Hector Martinez in the driver’s seat following a prowler call; Johnson determined the call was nonviolent before approaching.
Johnson conducted SFSTs, arrested Martinez for DWI around 1:00 a.m., and Martinez expressly refused breath/blood testing.
At the BAT bus (approx. 1:45 a.m.) Johnson discovered Martinez had multiple prior DWI convictions, which made a blood draw mandatory under Texas statute; Johnson transported Martinez toward jail but observed odd breathing/behavior at the sally port.
EMS was summoned, sedated Martinez during transport to the hospital, and Martinez’s blood was drawn at Breckenridge Hospital (approx. 3:34 a.m.), about 2.5 hours after arrest.
Officer Johnson never sought a search warrant (though he testified a magistrate would likely have been available and that phone warrants were an option) and said departmental policy motivated not obtaining a warrant.
A magistrate suppressed the blood evidence, concluding no exigency justified a warrantless draw, implied consent was not a Fourth Amendment exception, and the mandatory-draw statute did not override the warrant requirement; the trial court adopted those findings and granted suppression. The State appealed.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (State)	Defendant's Argument (Martinez)	Held
Whether exigent circumstances justified a warrantless blood draw	There was a medical emergency and a combative defendant that consumed time and made obtaining a warrant impracticable; totality of circumstances supports exigency.	No true exigency: officer had time and options to obtain a warrant, never attempted to do so, and relied on policy; medical intervention was precautionary, not life‑threatening.	Trial court: No exigency; warrantless draw unreasonable.
Whether the mandatory-blood statute authorizes a warrantless compelled blood draw	Statute mandates specimen collection for certain DWI offenders, authorizing the draw without a warrant.	Statute cannot override Fourth Amendment; Villarreal and other authorities hold mandatory-draw statutes do not obviate the warrant requirement.	Trial court: Statute does not validate a warrantless draw; suppression appropriate.
Whether implied consent or revocation affects the warrant requirement	Implied consent statute supplies authority to collect despite refusal.	Implied consent, once withdrawn, is not voluntary consent under Fourth Amendment; refusal prevents using implied-consent as a warrant exception.	Trial court: Martinez’s refusal negates voluntary consent; implied-consent statute does not justify warrantless seizure.
Whether exclusionary-rule exceptions (good-faith, retroactivity) bar suppression	Officer acted under then-existing law/policy; exclusionary rule or good-faith exception should allow admission; McNeely should not be applied retroactively to cases pending at the time.	Texas law (Art. 38.23) and Texas precedent limit good-faith; McNeely and related Texas rulings apply to pending cases and suppression is required.	Trial court: Federal good-faith exception inapplicable; evidence suppressed.

Key Cases Cited

Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141 (2013) (totality-of-circumstances exigency inquiry; dissipation of alcohol alone does not create a per se exigency)
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966) (upheld nonconsensual blood draw after serious automobile injuries; precedent discussed in McNeely)
Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435 (2013) (upheld warrantless DNA collection from arrestees for identification; distinguished from blood draws in DWI context)
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973) (voluntariness standard for consent searches)
Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340 (1987) (good-faith exception to exclusionary rule where officers rely on a statute later found unconstitutional)
Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314 (1987) (new rules announced by the Supreme Court apply retroactively to cases pending on direct review)