State v. Hector B. Almaraz, Jr.
154 Idaho 584
Idaho2013Background
- Almaraz and Salazar, BMC members, were at Club 7 bar when a fight erupted after Almaraz punched Flores; Flores died from a back gunshot.
- Hust, another patron, identified Almaraz as the shooter after a police interview where a photo grouping was shown and the tape was allegedly turned off during identification.
- District court admitted gang-related evidence (BMC and gang activity) under I.R.E. 404(b) to support motive; limiting instructions were given to the jury.
- Witness Salazar and Armando Landin testified about BMC’s criminal activity and gang color symbolism; Officer Cantrell testified on general gang life as an expert.
- Lieutenant Steele testified to a video frame interpretation describing Almaraz’s stance as a “shooter’s crouch”; Fredericks testified on video frame timing of the shooting.
- Almaraz was convicted of first-degree murder; sentence: life with 40 years fixed; conviction later vacated and remanded for a new trial due to evidentiary errors.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Admissibility of gang evidence for motive | Almaraz contends BMC acts and general gang crime are impermissible character evidence. | Almaraz claims evidence is relevant to motive and not to prove propensity. | District court did not abuse discretion; gang evidence admissible to prove motive. |
| Suppressibility of Hust’s identification due to suggestive procedures | Almaraz argues Hust’s identification was unreliable due to police suggestive practices. | Hust’s identification should be admitted; procedures not unduly prejudicial or unreliable. | Identification procedures were overly suggestive and not outweighed by reliability; admission improper. |
| Limitation of Dr. Reisberg’s testimony on identification procedures | Reisberg could testify about specific interview procedures affecting reliability. | Testimony would invade jury function by commenting on credibility. | District court erred by restricting Reisberg from discussing specific procedures; error not shown harmless. |
| Lieutenant Steele’s shooter’s crouch testimony | Steele’s testimony was necessary to explain video interpretation and not improper lay opinion. | Testimony invaded the jury’s fact-finding and relied on specialized knowledge. | Testimony within district court’s discretion; not an abuse of discretion due to limiting instructions. |
| Fredericks’ expert testimony on timing of the shot | Fredericks’ foundation and expertise properly supported his frame-timing opinion. | Foundation for physiological reaction testimony was insufficient. | District court did not abuse discretion; Fredericks properly qualified and foundation adequate. |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Hoisington, 104 Idaho 153 (Idaho 1983) (two-step test for eyewitness identification reliability)
- State v. Bay, 153 Idaho 564 (Idaho 2012) (standard for reviewing suppression rulings; substantial evidence findings)
- Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98 (U.S. 1977) (five-factor reliability framework for identifications)
- State v. Perry, 139 Idaho 520 (Idaho 2003) (expert testimony may address reliability without opining on credibility)
- State v. Guilbert, 306 Conn. 218 (Conn. 2012) (expert testimony on eyewitness reliability without invading jury function)
- State v. Enno, 119 Idaho 392 (Idaho 1991) (I.R.E. 403 balancing for prejudice vs probative value)
- Henderson, 27 A.3d 872 (N.J. 2011) (review of eyewitness identification research; system vs estimator variables)
- Hoisington / related cites, 104 Idaho 153, 657 P.2d 17 (Idaho 1983) (foundational framework for reliability of out-of-court identifications)